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REGULATORY COMPETITION, CHOICE OF FORUM, 
AND DELAWARE'S STAKE IN CORPORATE LAW 
By FAITH STEVELMAN* 
ABSTRACT 
As Delaware corporate law confronts the twenty-first-century global 
economy, the state's legislators and jurists are becoming sensitive to 
increased threats to the law's sustained preeminence. The increased 
presence of federal laws and regulations in areas of corporate governance 
traditionally allocated to the states has been widely noted. The growth of 
federal corporate law standards may be undermining Delaware's confidence 
in the sustained prosperity of its chartering business-which has been a vital 
source of revenues and prestige for Delaware, its equity courts, and 
especially its corporate bar. The Delaware Court of Chancery appears to 
be concerned about the emigration of corporate law cases to other states' 
courtrooms, and is exercising its discretionary jurisdiction more expansively 
in parallel proceedings to deny defendants' motions to stay. There are even 
more aggressive measures that Delaware companies and lawmakers could 
take to restrict Delaware shareholders' choice offorum and keep these cases 
in Delaware. But Delaware has much to lose from trying to gain monopoly 
power over the adjudication of its corporate law. Indeed, in a system where 
corporate managers (or founderslcontrolling shareholders) select the state 
of incorporation-and hence effectuate the choice of Delaware corporate 
law-it is likely that allowing shareholder-plaintiffs freedom in forum 
selection has a salutary, modulating effect on Delaware corporate law. The 
ability of Delaware shareholder-plaintiffs to litigate elsewhere most likely 
plays a key role in preventing Delaware corporate law from becoming 
hostage to corporate defendants' interests. 
*ProfessorofLaw and Director, Center on Business Law & Policy, New York Law School. 
Special thanks are owed to Professor Steven Davidoff, and to NYLS Professors Molly Beutz, James 
Grimrnelman, David Johnson, Edward Purcell, and Donald Zeigler, as well as participants in the 
NYLS Faculty Colloquium where an earlier draft was presented. This article is dedicated to my 
parents, Barbara and Harold Stevelman, who listened to its early beginnings in a Chinese restaurant 
in Yorktown, New York; and to Thelma Stuart, for her loving kindness across three generations. 
57 
58 DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW [Vol. 34 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
1. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................... 59 
II. DELAWARE'S STAKE IN CORPORATE LAW................................. 66 
A. Delaware's Financial Stake in Corporate Chartering....... 66 
B. Fees and Prestige for the Delaware Bar ........................... 69 
C. The Special Power and Prestige of Delaware's Chan-
cellors and Supreme Court Justices ...................... ............ 71 
Ill. CHOICE OF LAW: FOUNDATIONS OF THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS 
DOCTRINE.................................................................................. 74 
A. History of the Internal Affairs Doctrine ........................... 75 
B. Judicial Deference to the Chartering State ...................... 78 
C. Choice of Corporate Law................................................ 80 
D. The Regulatory Competition Defense for the lAD ........... 82 
E. Constitutional Claims for the lAD ................................... 84 
IV. FEDERAL THREATS TO DELAWARE'S PREEMINENCE IN 
CORPORATE LAW....................................................................... 89 
A. Eradication Through Express Preemption...................... 89 
B. Eclipse or Marginalization ........ ............ .......................... 90 
1. Federal Laws and SEC Regulations......................... 90 
2. Listing Standards from the Exchanges and the 
NASD ...................................................................... 93 
3. Shareholder Activist Initiatives................................ 95 
V. CHOICE OF FORUM: HORIZONTAL THREATS TO DELAWARE'S 
PREEMINENCE............................................................................ 96 
A. Incentives to File Suit Outside of Delaware................ ..... 97 
B. Alternative Tribunals, Alternative Procedural Rules....... 100 
1. In General ................................................................ 100 
2. Juries........................................................................ 100 
3. In re Cox and Plaintiff-Attorneys' Fees .................... 101 
C. Delaware's Traditional Approaches to Resolving 
Forum Disputes ............................................................... 104 
1. First-Filed Actions-Forum Non Conveniens 
Doctrine .................... ..... ............ ............ .................. 104 
2. Second-Filed Actions-The McWane Presumption 
Favoring a Stay........................................................ 107 
D. The Court of Chancery's Post-McWane Jurisprudence .. 108 
1. Less Deference to Strict Filing Chronology............. 109 
2. Favoring the Better-Drafted Complaint ................... 111 
2009] REGulAroRY CoMPEImON 59 
3. Less Deference to Plaintiffs' Choices in Derivative 
and Class Actions. ... .......... ...... ......... ........ ...... .... ..... 112 
4. Keeping Cases Presenting Novel Issues of Dela-
ware Law ................................................................. 115 
5. The Indeterminate Effect of Contractual Choice of 
of Forum Provisions... .............. .... ...... ................. ..... 118 
E. Topps-A Case Study in Keeping Forum ........................ 119 
1. Internal Affairs Unbound: Our Law, Our Forum ..... 119 
2. Delaware Adjudication and Clarity in Delaware 
Corporate Law.... .......... ......... .... ...... ....... .......... .... ... 122 
3. Reconsidering Clarity and Efficiency in Delaware 
Corporate Law... ... ....... ..... .... ... .... ... ... .............. ........ 123 
F. More on Motives to Refuse to Stay ................................... 126 
1. Publicity, Prestige, and Fees: Delaware's Incentive 
to Keep High-Profile M&A and Self-Dealing 
Cases ........................................................................ 127 
2. Keeping Control Over the Brand in Order to 
Promote Chartering ............... .......... .............. ..... ...... 130 
3. The Delaware Courts' Incentive to Support the 
Delaware Bar ........................................................... 130 
VI. MECHANISMS FOR KEEPING CASES IN DELAWARE AND THEIR 
RISKS ......................................................................................... 131 
A. Federal Jurisdiction-A Prologue ................................... 131 
B. Bylaw Provisions ............................................................. 132 
C. Charter Provisions ..... ... ... .... ... ... ........... .... ........ ..... ....... ... 133 
D. Legislation Restricting Forum Choice ............................. 135 
E. Judicial Doctrine (Case Law) .......................................... 135 
VII. CONCLUSION: HARDBALL TACTICS FOR KEEPING FORUM 
WOULD BE BAD FOR DELAWARE .............................................. 137 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In matters of state corporate law, Delaware has won-that is the 
consensus among scholars, commentators, and practicing corporate lawyers. 
A majority of the largest public companies elect to incorporate in Delaware. 
Annual fees from selling corporate charters can generate as much as $600 
million or morel-about one-fifth of the state's total annual tax revenue. 
'See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: 
Reconsidering the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.1. 553, 556 n.13 (2002) 
(citing U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, DELAWARE STATE GoVERNMENTTAXC0lLECl10NS: 2001 (2002), 
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Delaware's corporate law enjoys extraordinary respect and prestige, as do the 
state's corporate lawyers and judges. Litigation involving powerful, 
Delaware-incorporated companies fills the docket of the Delaware Court of 
Chancery (Court of Chancery) and the cover pages of The Wall Street 
Journal. 
Delaware's preeminence in corporate law is vitally connected to the 
internal affairs doctrine (lAD). Under the lAD, incorporation effectuates a 
choice of corporate law that is binding on the corporation and its directors, 
officers, and controlling shareholders. Even if a Delaware-incorporated 
company, its managers, or controlling shareholders become defendants in 
out-of-state corporate lawsuits, Delaware's corporate statutes and fiduciary 
tenets will still govern. The lAD makes choice of corporate law durable, 
which is relevant to decision making about chartering, of course. 
Given Delaware's success in chartering, the prestige enjoyed by its 
corporate law, and the "stickiness" of Delaware choice oflaw under the lAD, 
one might expect Delaware's legislators and judges to be confident, if not 
smug, in their success. Instead, there are signs that some of them may be 
anxious about the future preeminence of Delaware corporate law, and 
perhaps with good reason. 
This article examines two plausible threats to Delaware's preeminence 
in corporate law--<me arising from federal law, and the other from the 
potential out-of-state adjudication of Delaware corporate law cases. Its 
primary focus is the latter: the adjudication of Delaware corporate law cases 
beyond Delaware's courtrooms, and Delaware's actual and optimal response 
to this perceived threat. In this vein, the article sheds light on the relation-
ship between core principles of Delaware corporate law, and rules of choice 
of law and choice of forum. It also provides a window into the larger 
institutional and practical forces shaping Delaware corporate law. 
With respect to the "vertical" threat posed by federal law, Congress 
could always preempt corporate law for public companies based on its 
authority under the Commerce Clause.2 Even the mere threat of such pre-
emption, as Professor Mark Roe has demonstrated, shapes and potentially 
inhibits Delaware's freedom in crafting corporate legal standards.3 Further-
more, the burgeoning set of federal corporate law-related statutes, Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations, listing standards, and 
available at http://www.census.gov/govs/statetaxlOI08destax.html). 
2U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
3See MarkJ. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARv. L. REv. 588, 600-02, 636 (2003) 
(arguing that the development of Delaware corporate law is pervasively shaped by actual or 
perceived threats of federal preemption, such that an overall trend towards efficiency or inefficiency 
is indeterminate). 
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shareholder activists' "best practices" may be eclipsing the distinctness of 
Delaware's corporate law. Over time, this could reduce the incentive of out-
of-state managers to charter in Delaware. There is little Delaware can do 
about this, other than avoiding provoking federal ire. 
The "horizontal" jurisdictional threat to Delaware's preeminence-and 
Delaware's present and optimal response to it-is the focus of this article. In 
comparison to the growth of federal corporate law and its implications for 
Delaware, this is a subject which has gone largely unnoticed in corporate law 
scholarship.4 Under the modem, liberal rules of jurisdiction, shareholder-
plaintiffs typically have the option to pursue Delaware corporate law cases in 
other state courts, as well as federal forums under diversity and supplemental 
jurisdiction.5 Consequently, disputes in high-profile mergers and acquisi-
tions (M&A) transactions and allegations of fiduciary self-dealing governed 
by Delaware corporate law are more commonly being litigated outside of 
Delaware's state courts. Nor is this development unwelcome to other states, 
apparently. New York, perhaps most obviously, may benefit from the 
erosion of the Delaware courts' hold on high-profile corporate cases.6 In 
sum, Delaware's absolute control over its corporate law and its corporate law 
cases is under pressure "vertically" (as a result of the evolution of federal 
corporate law) and "horizontally" (as a result of Delaware corporate law 
claims being litigable and litigated out of state). 
The optimal response for Delaware-the response that will promote 
the integrity and future preeminence of Delaware corporate law and 
Delaware's chartering business-is not immediately obvious. Clearly, the 
4But see Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, How to Prevent Hard Cases from Making Bad 
Law: Bear Steams, Delaware and the Strategic Use of Comity, 58 EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2009); 
Mark Lebovitch & Laura Gundersheim, "Novel Issues" or a Return to Core Principles? Analyzing 
the Common Link Between the Delaware Chancery Court's Recent Rulings in Options Backdating 
and Transactional Cases, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 505 (2008). 
sFor discussion of the effect of long-arm statutes, the scope of federal jurisdiction, and the 
effect of removal, see Debra Lyn Bassett, The Forum Game, 84 N.C. L. REv. 333 (2006); Geoffrey 
P: Miller, Overlapping Class Actions, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 514 (1996). 
~ the recent high-profile forum clashes in the sales of Bear Stearns to J.P. Morgan and 
Merrill Lynch to Bank of America, there were shareholder complaints med in the Court of Chancery 
as well as the New York Supreme Court; in fact, the complaints were "flfSt med" in New Yorlc The 
New York court demonstrated no predilection to defer to Delaware's jurisdiction in either instance. 
The New York actions in the state trial court, as well as certain federal derivative actions are cited in 
County of York Employees Retirement Plan v. Merrill Lynch & Co., No. 4066-VCN, 2008 WL 
4824053, at *1 n.2 (Del. Ch. Oct. 28, 2008). There was also a standoff between New York and 
Delaware in the forum dispute pertaining to the sale of Topps to private equity fIrms. In re The 
Topps Co. Sbolders Litig., 924 A.2d 951, 961-65 (Del. Ch. 2007) (discussing New York's interest 
in the litigation and the fact that "New York is one of the states that has formed a commercial part of 
its court system to improve its handling of business disputes"). 
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Court of Chancery is not pleased by the seemingly increased interstate travel 
of Delaware corporate law claims. If non-Delaware courts most commonly 
resolved Delaware corporate law disputes, this would dilute the distinctive-
ness of Delaware corporate law, and erode the value of Delaware's chartering 
business. The question arises, therefore, how far Delaware lawmakers and 
judges should go in attempting to limit shareholder-plaintiffs' freedom to 
litigate Delaware corporate law cases in other state courts? 
Delaware's anxiousness about corporate claims emigration is notable 
in certain recent Court of Chancery rulings resolving forum disputes. In 
these rulings, the court is more commonly refusing to stay claims before it 
notwithstanding that earlier commenced parallel proceedings are ongoing 
elsewhere. Where it has the later-filed complaint in a forum dispute, 
Delaware has conventionally applied the "McWane" rule or presumption, 
which favors the granting of a stay.7 But the Court of Chancery is more 
commonly rejecting the McWane presumption, especially in forum disputes 
in parallel proceedings. More commonly, in refusing to stay the later-filed 
claim before it, the court is improvising-presenting novel arguments to 
distinguish McWane and keep jurisdiction.s 
At the same time, in forum disputes where Delaware does have the 
first-filed complaint before it, the courts nearly universally refuse motions to 
stay, consistent with their long established forum non conveniens juris-
prudence. They do so unhesitatingly, moreover, even if the case requires 
them to adjudicate novel issues in sister states' corporate laws.9 Adding 
together these two juridical practices, we see that Delaware's approach to 
comity is increasingly to keep both first-filed claims (consistent with its 
forum non conveniens jurisprudence) and second-filed claims (despite the 
McWane presumption). 
In departing from McWane's presumption favoring the stay of later-
filed claims, again, the Court of Chancery is enunciating new tests and 
principles to keep forum. For example, in In re The Topps Co. Shareholders 
7McWane Cast Iron Pipe Corp. v. McDowell-Wellman Eng'g Co., 263 A.2d 281, 283 (Del. 
1970); see also infra Part V.C-E (discussing the McWane rule and the Delaware Court of 
Chancery's recent departure from its doctrine). 
8It has done so, especially, in noteworthy M&A disputes and fiduciary breach cases 
involving Delaware public companies. However, a notable exception to the pattern of Delaware 
keeping the high visibility, "glamour" cases is the Court of Chancery's grant of a stay in a 
shareholder claim challenging the proposed sale of Bear Stearns. The "trick" for Delaware in 
deploying forum doctrine is to keep most high publicity cases, but avoid negative publicity. See 
infra Part V. 
9 A terminological point: the selection among alternative federal or state tribunals-whether 
within or beyond Delaware-is referred to herein under the rubric of choice of "forum," 
notwithstanding that choice of "venue" would be an equally acceptable nomenclature. 
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Litigation, 10 as part of its rationale for keeping forum, the Court of Chancery 
cited efficiency gains, constitutional principles, and the nature and purpose 
of the IAD. With respect to the latter, contrary to the court's protestations, 
the choice of law regime reflected in the IAD does not provide anything like 
a blanket basis for Delaware keeping forum over Delaware corporate law 
claims. As developed in Part ill, once stripped of historically based, now 
antiquated notions, the lAD is only meaningful as a choice of law regime. It 
does not resolve Delaware's concern about the interstate adjudication of 
claims because choice of (Delaware) law does not mandate choice of 
(Delaware) forum. The IAD is neither dispositive of, nor even particularly 
meaningful to the resolution of forum disputes. 
But the IAD has an even more fundamental shortcoming as a 
mechanism for Delaware achieving monopoly power over the development 
of its corporate case law. That is, the IAD does not require non-Delaware 
tribunals to apply Delaware's rules of civil procedure. II Although the IAD 
ensures the "stickiness" of substantive corporate law, foreign forums would 
apply their own rules of civil procedure (which of course could radically 
impact the litigation). Rules relevant to discovery and the recovery of 
attorneys' fees, for example, affect the strength and even the viability of 
plaintiffs' substantive claims. This means that even the prospect of out-of-
state adjudication of Delaware corporate lawsuits (which would mandate the 
application of non-Delaware procedural rules to the case) foreseeably 
influences, ex ante, Delaware judges' own decision making. As it is surely 
aware, the Court of Chancery cannot be too draconian in limiting discovery 
or plaintiffs' fee reimbursement without propelling some number of cases to 
other jurisdictions-a result it ordinarily wishes to avoid. Moreover, if 
Delaware corporate defendants ordinarily prefer that their claims remain in 
Delaware, then the Court of Chancery can rationalize not being too harsh 
towards the plaintiffs and their lawyers as being in the defendants' best 
interest as well. In sum, the IAD does not afford Delaware the full measure 
of control over its corporate law that Delaware judges might think they want. 
But the result is most likely a fair, more moderate body of corporate law, 
which promotes Delaware's long term interests. 
In recent forum disputes, the Court of Chancery has also claimed that 
large scale efficiency gains arise from having Delaware's courts adjudicate 
Delaware corporate law. While paying lip service to the competence of 
other state court judges, the Court of Chancery has expressed concern that 
10924 A.2d 951 (Del. Ch. 2(07). 
lIThe lAD's limits, as \hey relate to rules of civil procedure, have largely been unrecognized 
in \he academic corporate law literature. See infra Part V.B. 
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non-Delaware judges will misapply and distort Delaware corporate law-
rendering it less clear, less consistent, and less predictable-to the 
disadvantage of Delaware shareholders and market participants broadly. 12 
These efficiency-based claims for Delaware's expansive (if not universal) 
jurisdiction over Delaware corporate law cases warrant closer scrutiny. Put 
simply, if Delaware corporate law is as clear and consistent as the Court of 
Chancery suggests (in worrying that it will be impaired by out-of-state 
adjudication), then it is difficult to believe that other courts will unwittingly 
misinterpret it. Alternatively, if the tenets of Delaware corporate law are too 
opaque or too vague to reliably be applied by other judges, then they are too 
opaque or too vague to be "read" by shareholders, deal planners, and the 
marketplace-which would suggest there is gross inefficiency (rather than 
wealth enhancing efficiency) in the structure of Delaware corporate law. 
Finally, if Delaware corporate law is fair and principled, then there is little 
reason to fear that out-of-state judges would purposely misapply it. 
There surely are legal means for Delaware lawmakers and judges to 
thwart the interstate travel of Delaware corporate law cases. The conclusion 
reached herein, however, is that Delaware and its corporate law (as well as 
Delaware's judges and corporate litigators) have much to lose from strong-
arm tactics to force forum. Overly expansive, sovereignty-based claims for 
the lAD open the door to harsh judicial responses and academic criticism, as 
do claims about the Delaware courts' unique competence to interpret and 
apply Delaware's corporate case law. The former involves a distinctly 
contestable claim about the law; the latter an arguably hubristic claim on the 
part of Delaware's judges. Given Delaware's embrace of flexible, open-
ended fiduciary standards, warnings that out-of-state adjudication will 
damage the clarity and predictability of Delaware's corporate case law invite 
skepticism, if not harsh criticism, which Delaware should wish to avoid. 
But the argument against forcing forum goes to the heart of corporate 
law, as proposed above. The porousness of the lAD, in tandem with 
modem, liberal rules of jurisdiction, operate to promote the reasonableness 
and hence the legitimacy and preeminence of Delaware corporate law. 
Shareholder-plaintiffs' option to be heard in alternative forums, under 
alternative procedural rules, creates a ballast against excessive partisanship 
in Delaware's own adjudication. Given Delaware's financial and prestige-
based stakes in promoting its successful chartering business, a bias in favor 
12See Topps, 924 A.2d at 959 ("The important coherence-generating benefits created by our 
judiciary's handling of corporate disputes are endangered if our state's compelling public policy 
interest in deciding these disputes is not recognized and decisions are instead routinely made by a 
variety of state and federal judges who only deal episodically with our law. "). 
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of manager/controller friendly rules is likely to result (because directors or 
officers, or otherwise founders/controllers select the state of incorporation). 
Hence allowing ordinary shareholders freedom of choice regarding forum 
most likely exerts a salutary, equilibrating effect on Delaware corporate law. 
This moderating influence operates on two fronts. First, if Delaware's 
substantive corporate law doctrines or its rules of procedure applicable to 
corporate law cases (for example in relation to plaintiff-lawyers' right to 
reimbursement of fees) become excessively partisan in management's 
direction, this would propel some number of claims to alternative tribunals-
an effect which Delaware's judges wish to avoid and can correct for ex ante. 
Second, if out -of-state judges were persistently to fault Delaware's corporate 
law standards, or refused to apply them according to their terms, this would 
provide a salutary "red flag" alerting Delaware judges to the need to reset 
their compass. Furthermore, strictly speaking, out-of-state rulings cannot 
directly impair Delaware corporate law because they have no precedential 
effect on Delaware or other courts interpreting Delaware law. 13 Like most 
powerful institutions, the Delaware courts might prefer to exercise their 
authority without caveats or outside influence. But in the development of 
corporate law, as elsewhere, the exercise of monopoly power is damaging 
and ultimately self-defeating. This article's thesis is that strong-arm tactics to 
curtail shareholders' choice of forum would undermine Delaware's 
preeminence in corporate law. 
To recap, Part II of this article considers Delaware's monetary and 
nonmonetary stakes in preserving the preeminence of its corporate law and 
its successful chartering business. After discussing the historical develop-
ment and rationales for the lAD, Part ill concludes that as a choice of law 
regime, the lAD has little force as a rationale for Delaware keeping forum 
over Delaware corporate lawsuits. Part IV briefly surveys the growing 
influence of federal law in the corporate area, and the threat it poses for 
Delaware corporate law and chartering. Part V fIrst reviews Delaware's 
established jurisprudence governing forum disputes, both for fIrst-fIled 
actions (under the rubric ofJorum non conveniens) and later-fIled actions 
13For u.s. Supreme Court authority elucidating the absolute authority of state courts to 
interpret state law, see Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496,499-500 (1941) ("The 
last word on the meaning of Article 6445 of the Texas Civil Statutes, and therefore the last word on 
the statutory authority of the Railroad Commission in this case, belongs neither to us nor to the 
district court but to the supreme court of Texas. "). By implication Pullman also validates the notion 
that a state has the [mal word on the interpretation of its own laws. The autonomy of each state to 
enact its own laws and have its own courts interpret them is so fundamental that it is universally 
presumed without citation. 
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(under the McWane presumption). It then analyzes the new standards and 
rationales enunciated by the Court of Chancery in departing from this dual 
framework to resolve forum disputes in parallel proceedings. Part VI 
discusses various legal mechanisms available to curtail shareholder-
plaintiffs' freedom in choosing among legitimate forums, while counseling 
forbearance in each case. Part VIT, by way of conclusion, further elaborates 
why Delaware should eschew strong-arm tactics to force forum. 
IT. DELAWARE'S STAKE IN CORPORATE LAW 
A. Delaware's Financial Stake in Corporate Chartering 
In a recent retrospective, former Delaware Supreme Court Chief 
Justice Veasey proudly referred to his state's "international attractiveness as 
the incorporation domicile of choice. ,,14 His point is universally accepted. 
Among the fifty states, Delaware has visibly succeeded in claiming the 
number one spot in attracting and retaining incorporations. Moreover, the 
preference for Delaware incorporation is especially notable among the 
richest and most powerful American corporations-a fact which undoubt-
edly contributes to the prestige and influence of Delaware corporation law. 15 
The statistics reflecting Delaware's dominance in the chartering 
business are subject only to slight variation year to year. As related by 
former Chief Justice Veasey, 
Nearly sixty percent of the Fortune 500 companies and nearly 
the same proportion of those listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange are Delaware corporations. In addition, seventy 
percent of initial public offerings in 2004 on the New York 
Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange, and the 
NASDAQ were Delaware corporations. 16 
Moreover, according to Professor Robert Daines, ninety-seven percent of all 
U.S. public companies incorporate either in their home state or in 
14E. Nonnan Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What Happened in Delaware Corpo-
rate Law and Govemancefrom 1992-2004? A Retrospective on Some Key Developments, 153 U. 
PA. L. REv. 1399, 1402 (2005). 
ISSee id. at 1403 (noting that Delaware is home to approximately sixty percent of Fortune 
500 companies); see also Robert Daines, The Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms, 77 N.Y.U. L. 
REv. 1559, 1560 (2002) (reiterating an earlier finding that firms incorporated in Delaware are worth 
significantly more than those incorporated in other states). 
16Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 14, at 1403. 
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Delaware. 17 For firms choosing to incorporate outside their home state, 
eighty-five percent choose Delaware, and in total, Delaware accounts for 
fifty-eight percent of all U.S. public company charters. 18 Consistent with 
these statistics, though scholars disagree about the reasons for and the impact 
of Delaware's success, its preeminence as the purveyor of nationally-relevant 
corporate law is beyond dispute. 19 
Since Delaware is a comparatively small state, the franchise taxes and 
filing fees paid annually by Delaware-incorporated entities make up a 
sizeable percentage of the state's annual tax revenue. For recent years, the 
figures vary from a low of sixteen percent to a high of twenty-five percent-
with twenty percent being average?O As these figures reveal, a drop in 
franchise fees from existing or new charters could impair the state's budget, 
i.e., the funding of essential services including construction, education, and 
health care. As noted by Professor Lawrence Hamermesh, Delaware's 
legislators are acutely aware of the importance of franchise fees in the state's 
budget.21 This awareness encourages the General Assembly to keep 
Delaware's corporation code state-of-the-art.22 Indeed, Delaware's relative 
dependence on franchise fees in its state budget has a positive feedback 
effect on chartering. It adds credibility to Delaware's commitment to 
keeping its corporate law cutting edge. 
Delaware's chartering success is not a byproduct of its geography. 
Aside from small, local businesses, the choice of where to incorporate 
usually has no nexus to the location of the company's headquarters or major 
operations. A company's senior managers select the state of incorporation 
17Daines, supra note 15, at 1562. 
18Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note I, at 578 & tbl.5. 
19Delaware is also endeavoring to increase its market share in the area of smaller, closely-
held firms, LLCs, and LLPs. For statistics and discussion of Delaware's financial incentives in 
obtaining greater franchise tax and filing fee revenue from these other, smaller entities, see Timothy 
P. Glynn, Delaware's VantagePoint· The Empire Strikes Back in the Post-Post-Enron Era, 102 Nw. 
U. L. REv. 91, 125-31 (2008). 
20See Daines, supra note 15, at 1566 (explaining that fees from Delaware incorporations 
account for more than twenty percent of the state's revenues); Glynn, supra note 19, at 125 
(observing a decline in franchise taxes in 2006 to approximately sixteen percent of the state's overall 
revenue). Delaware's substantial financial interest in attracting and keeping incorporations has been 
noted in corporate legal scholarship for at least three and a half decades-as far back as William 
Cary's seminal article describing Delaware as winning a "race for the bottom." William L. Cary, 
Federalism and Corporate lAw: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 697-98 (1974) 
("[T]he state of Delaware derives a substantial portion, roughly one-quarter, of its income from 
corporation fees and franchise taxes .... "). 
21Lawrence A. Hamermesh, The Policy Foundations of Delaware Corporate lAw, 106 
COLUM. L. REv. 1749,1753-54 (2006). 
221d. at 1754. 
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(presumably with advice of counsel) based on which state's corporate laws 
they believe are best. 23 Delaware charges more in annual franchise and 
filing fees for the privilege of Delaware incorporation, but the greater 
marginal cost is unlikely to affect decision making for larger private and 
publicly traded companies.24 
Upon incorporation, the company's governance-its internal affairs-
will be defined by the chartering state's corporate statutes, case law, and any 
special terms included in the company's charter or bylaws. Within corporate 
law, "internal affairs" encompasses the statutory and judicial standards 
defining the corporation's legal personhood, rules for the effectuating 
mergers and acquisitions, charter and bylaw amendments, procedures for 
shareholder and board voting and meetings, and the rights and responsibili-
ties of shareholders, officers, and directors. 
In effect, the scope of corporate "internal affairs" constitutes what is 
defmed as corporate law in the United States. From the outside, however, 
corporate "internal affairs" encompasses a narrow range of corporate 
conduct. Neither the selection of the state of incorporation, nor the lAD 
effectuates a choice of law governing third parties' relations with the corpo-
ration. Suits involving contracts, torts, real property-hence relations with 
customers, suppliers, local communities, and claims by most creditors-are 
not part of the law of internal affairs fixed by the act of incorporation. 
Hence as they have crafted and "marketed" their corporate laws, Delaware 
lawmakers have not had to balance the welfare of powerful in-state 
23"Best" may mean most consistent with their private self-interest or the corporation's best 
interests more generally. Scholars who believe Delaware's open-endedness creates laxity and 
encourages self-dealing are identified with the "race to the bottom" school of thought, first given 
voice by Professor William Cary's famous article. See Cary, supra note 20. The alternative, "race to 
the top" school of thought posits that markets impound the quality of state corporate laws in 
securities prices, so that firms incorporating in states with efficiency-destroying corporate laws 
would pay a higher cost of capital-something corporate managers could ill afford. See, e.g., Ralph 
K. Winter, Ir., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 I. LEGAL 
STUD. 251 (1977). Finally, in recent "no more race" or "no race at all" versions, managers select 
Delaware corporate law because it is the acknowledged market leader (a safe move-akin to picking 
"Harvard"). For an articulate defense of this view, see Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of 
State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN., L. REv. 679, 724-27 (2002). Moreover, they do so 
in a world where Delaware's corporate law has been constrained fundamentally by real or feared 
federal intervention. See Roe, supra note 3. 
24Delaware charges slightly higher franchise fees than do other states; but for large firms, 
the relative cost difference is de minimis. For information on Delaware franchise fee rates, see 
STATE OF DEL. DEP'T OF FIN., 2007 FISCAL NOTEBOOK 97 (2008), http://fmance.delaware. 
gov/publicationslfiscal_notebook_07/Section07/corp_franchise.pdf. The franchise fee structure is 
set forth in the Delaware corporate code. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 391(a)(1)-(2), 503(a) 
(2001). Also, if one believes that Delaware law insufficiently restricts managerial agency costs, then 
managers who select Delaware are also able to "pass on" the higher cost of incorporation to the firm. 
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constituencies (such as organized labor) against the welfare of boards, 
officers, and shareholders of chartering fIrms. In this respect, the narrow 
scope of corporate law has facilitated the ability of Delaware lawmakers' to 
fIne tune their corporate laws and to market them as a specialized, valuable 
product to chartering fIrms. 
B. Fees and Prestige for the Delaware Bar 
Delaware corporate lawyers are a highly influential interest group 
affecting the development of the state's corporate law. In terms of pay and 
prestige, they have a high-stakes interest in sustaining the preeminence of 
Delaware corporate law. 
Wilmington's elite corporate law fIrms maintain a lucrative practice 
representing Delaware-incorporated companies involved in litigation in the 
Court of Chancery and Delaware Supreme Court. Out-of-state lawyers are 
not prohibited from advising clients on Delaware corporate law;25 for 
example, many New York lawyers specialize in M&A transactions in which 
Delaware's corporate jurisprudence plays a formative role.26 And general 
counsel of Delaware-incorporated public companies also have substantial 
expertise in Delaware corporate law matters. Nevertheless, because liti-
gation is a common feature of public company M&A transactions, 
appearances before the Court of Chancery are commonplace in these 
transactions, and out-of-state attorneys typically retain Delaware co-counsel 
for these appearances. 27 Hence, a de facto system of fee sharing has 
developed between Delaware co-counsel and non-Delaware general counsel 
and M&A lawyers. 
Delaware corporate litigators are also active both on the plaintiff and 
defense side in lawsuits alleging self-dealing and bad faith by officers, 
directors, and controlling shareholders. All of these are potentially lucrative 
areas of corporate practice. In sum, Delaware's corporate lawyers have 
2SDEL. LAWYERS' R. OF PRoF'L CONDuer § 5.5 (2008). 
2t>rhe most illustrious of these is probably Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, LLP. From the 
late 1980s onward, many "Wall Street" law f1nns developed M&A specialties. 
27The point is made, for example, by the "Deal Professor," Steven Davidoff. See Posting of 
Steven M. Davidoff to Dea1Book, http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.coml2oo8/051l4/clear-channel-
lessons-learned (May 14, 2008, 11:02 ESn ("There will almost always be a litigation hook to 
attempt to force a price renegotiation-and unlike in most situations, litigation is relatively costless 
in big deals: In a multibillion-dollar transaction, $50 million $100 million is less than the fees to the 
private equity f1nns. "). See also Steven M. Davidoff, The Failure of Private Equity, 82 S. CAL. L. 
REv. (forthcoming 2009) [hereinafter Davidoff, Private Equity] (examining the aspects of private 
equity deals and the roles of attorneys in these negotiations and transactions). 
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substantial stakes in maintaining the preeminence of Delaware corporate law 
and the success of the state's chartering business. 
Delaware corporate lawyers also influence the development of the 
state's corporation code through close collaboration with the Delaware 
General Assembly. This mutually beneficial professional relationship 
between Delaware's corporate bar and the General Assembly has been 
described by commentators, including Professor Lawrence Hamermesh. 
According to him, the Council of the Corporation Law Section of the 
Delaware State Bar Association has the function of "identifying and crafting 
legislative initiatives in the field of corporate law. ,,28 Rather than a standing 
body of the legislature, or legislative staff or lobbyists, these practitioners 
drawn from Delaware's elite corporate law firms take the lead in initiating 
changes to the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL).29 In this 
respect, Delaware's corporate lawyers have maximized their prestige, power, 
and professional opportunities by promoting Delaware's preeminence in 
corporate law. 
In 1987, Professors Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller published 
what they described as an "interest-group theory" of the development of 
Delaware corporate law. 30 Their article focused on the influential role of the 
state's corporate lawyers in shaping the development of Delaware corporate 
law.31 In addition to having an incentive to promote the quality of Delaware 
corporate law overall, Macey and Miller's account emphasized the lawyers' 
incentives to foster the litigation of corporate lawsuits in Delaware.32 This 
interest-group perspective-which highlights the role of Delaware corporate 
lawyers in shaping the state's corporate law in their own and the state's 
interest-continues to have bite. (This is especially true as it complements 
other theories of the development of corporate law. )33 
In conclusion, it is apparent that the national success of Delaware 
corporate law has created tremendous financial opportunities for enterprising 
Delaware corporate lawyers. It is equally apparent that these lawyers would 
be alert to thwarting changes in law and practice which might undermine 
Delaware's stature in corporate law and the success of its chartering business. 
28Hamennesh, supra note 21. at 1755. 
29ld. 
30Ionathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller. Toward an Interest-Group Theory o/Delaware 
Corporate Law. 65 TEx. L. REv. 469 (1987). 
31 See id. at 498-505. 
32ld. at 503-04. 
33"ThuS. the rules that Delaware supplies often can be viewed as attempts to maximize 
revenues to the bar. and more particularly to an elite cadre of Wilmington lawyers who practice 
corporate law in the state." Id. at 472. 
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C. The Special Power and Prestige 
of Delaware's Chancellors and Supreme Court Justices 
There are several respects in which Delaware's chancellors and 
supreme court justices enjoy unique status and power in comparison to other 
state judges. The Delaware Supreme Court has served as the unofficial 
"highest court" of corporate law, as a result of Delaware's success in 
chartering and Congress's historic reluctance to trespass on corporate internal 
affairs. Overstating only slightly, in a 2005 University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review article, former Delaware Supreme Court Chief Justice Norman 
Veasey stated that "[t]he Delaware Supreme Court, of course, has the last 
word in corporate jurisprudence. . .. The Delaware Supreme Court is 
certainly 'infallible' in the sense that it is the final word in corporate law.,,34 
His statements are consistent with Delaware's market .share in public 
company incorporations, as well as Delaware's influence on other states' 
corporate laws. 
About seventy-five percent of the Court of Chancery's docket is 
composed of corporate and other business-related cases.35 There are only 
five judges on the Court of Chancery (one chancellor and four vice 
chancellors), and five Delaware Supreme Court justices, which means they 
acquire extraordinary expertise in corporate legal matters. Noting that 
eighty-five to ninety percent of the Court of Chancery's final judgments are 
not appealed, former Chief Justice Veasey concluded that "[t]he Court of 
Chancery makes much of our corporate law. ,,36 This scope of authority is 
truly extraordinary for a state trial court. 37 
The power exercised by Delaware judges is enlarged substantially by 
the open-ended, enabling nature of the DGCL. This open-endedness allows 
Delaware corporations flexibility to tailor their governance structure to their 
precise goals and circumstances, in the name of promoting wealth 
maximization. The open-ended texture of the DGCL also means that 
Delaware's judges craft most of the crucial standards in corporate law, often 
34Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 14, at 1408. 
35Jd. 
36Jd. 
37 As if anticipating critiques of the Delaware courts' power, and to add legitimacy to its 
decision making, the Delaware constitution expressly provides for a bipartisan judiciary at both 
levels. Judges are appointed for twelve-year terms by the governor, after nomination by a bipartisan 
commission, and confirmed by the state senate. On both courts, there may be no more than a bare 
majority from any political party. Again, this formal bipartisanship contributes to the authority and 
perceived legitimacy of the court in its decisions affecting major business transactions. For further 
detailed discussion of the composition of the Delaware courts and their philosophy in deciding 
corporate law cases, see id. at 1402-07. 
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under the rubric of applying fiduciary duties to the conduct of directors, 
officers, and controlling shareholders.38 Indeed, apart from appraisal cases, 
with few exceptions, it is difficult to identify corporate cases where the 
holding was dictated by the terms of the DGCL. 39 
Of course, formally speaking, Delaware's corporation statutes are more 
authoritative than its case law (which cannot contravene them). But in 
practice, Delaware's equity courts have expanded their authority well beyond 
the boundaries of the DGCL. They have done so by invalidating corporate 
acts which they deemed inequitable under the circumstances, notwith-
standing that the acts or transactions conformed to the letter of the DGCL. 40 
Through this equitable mode of decision making, for example, the Delaware 
courts have defined the most important standards governing public company 
M&A transactions.41 In sum, the open-ended texture of the DGCL, in 
combination with the expertise, boldness, and ambitiousness of Delaware's 
judges in corporate law matters, has produced an extraordinary rich body of 
corporate case law, has fostered Delaware's success in chartering, and has 
led to the adjudication in Delaware's Court of Chancery of many of the most 
important corporate law cases in recent history.42 
38See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(9) (2001). See also Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48,61 
(Del. 1991) (using "reasonableness" and business judgment concepts as a heuristic in approving a 
several million dollar gift to the CEO's favored charity); Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 
A.2d 398, 405 (Del. Ch. 1969) (devising a rule of "reasonableness" to govern corporate charitable 
contributions in the face of the statute's open ended allowance). 
39See Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242, 248 (Del. 2001) (exhibiting a 
rare example where the Delaware Supreme Court held that fiduciary fair dealings criteria are 
inapposite in short-fonn mergers consistent with the Delaware legislature's affinnation of a 
streamlined process which allows controlling shareholders to bypass both board and shareholder 
consent of the disappearing entity). 
4(JSee. e.g., Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437,439-40 (Del. 1971)(granting 
preliminary injunction to prevent management from changing the annual meeting date for the 
purpose of thwarting a proxy fight); Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 661, 670 
(Del. Ch. 1988) (enjoining board's alteration of its structure to thwart a proposed consent solicitation 
and recapitalization transaction while mandating a "compelling justification" standard for board 
interference with shareholder voting for directors). 
41For discussion of Delaware's M&A jurisprudence in relation to strategic struggles over 
jurisdiction, see Kahan & Rock, supra note 4; Lebovitch & Gundersheim, supra note 4. 
42See. e.g., Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competitionfor 
Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REv. 1061, 1074 (2000) (arguing that Delaware corporate law's 
central reliance on judge-made standards confers a competitive advantage on this body of corporate 
law and fuels the state's success in attracting and retaining charters); Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, 
Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of Corporate Law, 58 V AND. L. REv. 1573, 1591 (2005) 
(stating that "[t]he most noteworthy trait of Delaware's corporate law is the extent to which 
important and controversial legal rules are promulgated by the judiciary, rather than enacted by the 
legislature"). 
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Another factor fostering Delaware's preeminence in corporate law is 
that the federal laws and SEC regulations applicable to M&A transactions 
have largely been confined to promoting disclosure. Again, the most 
influential standards shaping public companies' and shareholders'rights in 
M&A transactions arise from the Delaware courts' elaboration of fiduciary 
standards-rather than the DGCL, federal laws, or the SEC's rules.43 For 
example, Delaware's fiduciary standards define the nature and scope of 
directors' duties in sales of corporate control and the scope of their discretion 
in erecting defenses to unsolicited takeover offers (the so-called Revlon 44 and 
Unocat5 standards, respectively). Delaware's fiduciary standards also defme 
the scope of acceptable profit -taking by controlling shareholders in freezeout 
transactions and other self-dealing scenarios.46 To be sure, a broad set of 
federal laws and regulations influence public company M&A transactions. 
For example, the Williams Act's amendments to the Securities Exchange Act 
significantly influence the conduct of tender offers.47 But beyond mandating 
disclosure and prohibiting fraud in these deals, the federal securities laws 
mostly prescribe only minimal due process-like requirements.48 Naturally, 
Delaware's preeminence in the M&A area has generated great prestige for 
the state's judges. 
43Steven M. Davidoff, The SEC and the Failure of Federal Takeover Regulation, 34 RA. 
ST. U. L. REv. 211,239-47 (2007) (arguing that Delaware has taken the lead in takeover regulation, 
filling the void left by the SEC and Congress). In the area of controllers' going-private transactions, 
for example, see Faith Steveiman, Going Private at the Intersection of the Market and the Law, 62 
Bus. LAW. 775, 781 (2007) (elucidating the fiduciary standards relevantto controllers' going-private 
transactions, as well as the background and secondary set of relevant federal regulations). 
44Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) 
(requiring directors in a sale of control to take all steps reasonably necessary to obtain the best price 
in the shareholders' interest). 
4SUnocai Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 958 (Del. 1985) (applying a higher 
standard of judicial scrutiny when reviewing takeover defenses invoked by target boards of 
directors). 
46See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710-11 (Del. 1983) (requiring fair dealing 
and fair price in freezeout mergers of minority shareholders); see also Kahn v. Lynch Commc'n 
Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1117 (Del. 1994) (mandating that disinterested director ratification shifts 
the burden of proof to the plaintiff to demonstrate unfairness but does not reestablish business 
judgment deference in a freezeout merger context); Steveiman, supra note 43. For discussion of the 
judicial standards applied to controlling shareholders' self-dealing transactions beyond the going-
private context, see Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422,428-29 (Del. 1997). 
47For discussion of the history and limits of federal tender offer regulation, see Davidoff, 
supra note 43, at 215-24. For the views of a highly accomplished practitioner reflecting the salience 
of Delaware's M&A jurisprudence in takeover practice, see Igor Kirman, Takeover Law and 
Practice, in DOING DEALS 2007: UNDERSTANDING THE NUTS AND BOLTS OF TRANSACTIONAL 
PRACTICE 9, 18-19 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series No. B-1594, 2007). 
48For discussion, see Stevelman, supra note 43, at 800-02 (noting minimal due process-like 
requirements arising from the Williams Act). 
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Indeed, Delaware's prominence in high-stakes M&A transactions is in 
many ways the crown jewel of its corporate law. Professors Robert 
Thompson and Randall Thomas have recently completed an empirical 
analysis of the corporate cases on the Court of Chancery's docket. These 
professors found that shareholder class actions challenging M&A trans-
actions, including going-private deals, composed the bulk of the corporate 
cases before the court.49 Derivative suits alleging breaches of fiduciary 
loyalty were the second most prevalent, though not nearly as numerous.50 In 
light of the prestige and media attention these cases generate, and the 
indirect financial benefits they afford the state, Delaware's chancellors and 
supreme court justices have a powerful interest in having these cases 
litigated in Delaware. 
ill. CHOICE OF LAW: 
FOUNDATIONS OF THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS DOCTRINE 
Superficially, the lAD seems like it would solve Delaware's "forum 
problem"-that it would provide a rationale for keeping cases governed by 
Delaware corporate law in the Delaware courts. In this mode, the Court of 
Chancery's recent opinion in In re The Topps Co. Shareholders Litigation51 
invoked the lAD to support its refusal to stay its jurisdiction. But despite 
Topps' assertions, neither efficiency based, constitutionally based or 
sovereignty-based claims for the lAD support Delaware's resolve to keep 
forum in parallel proceedings governed by Delaware corporate law. 
Ontological or taxonomical claims that corporations "are" creatures of state 
law are anachronistic and incoherent under modern corporate law and legal 
theory. For these reasons, the modern lAD is really meaningful only as a 
choice of law regime. As such, it has only marginal relevance in resolving 
forum disputes. 
To provide a background for distinguishing choice oflaw and choice 
of forum issues, and to illustrate the limits of choice of forum arguments 
based on the lAD, the discussion below describes the lAD's origin and 
historical development. 
49Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder Litigation: 
Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 V AND. L. REv. 133, 167-68 (2004) (demonstrating that 
concern over excessive derivative claims is misplaced and Delaware's docket is composed, at 
present, mostly of shareholder class actions contesting M&A transactions). 
sOpor a recent, notable example of a derivative claim alleging a fiduciary loyalty breach, see 
infra note 214 and accompanying text (discussing the Delaware Court of Chancery's decision in 
Ryan v. Gifford, 918 A.2d 341 (Del. Ch. 2007». 
51924 A.2d 951 (Del. Ch. 2(07). 
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A. History of the Internal Affairs Doctrine 
Again, under modem law the lAD is best understood merely as a 
choice of law regime. 52 The roots of the lAD, however, lead back to a very 
different historical reality and set of legal concerns.53 
As Professor Frederick Tung's historical analysis illuminates: "The 
animating ideas behind the internal affairs doctrine were formed during the 
pre-industrial period-from the American Revolution to the middle of the 
nineteenth century. ,,54 Hence, the lAD, as it evolved in early twentieth-
century judicial decisions, was infused with historical assumptions reflecting 
the early development of corporations in American law. The lAD reflected 
the very different way that corporations operated and were created in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century. As illustrated by Topps, these 
historical anachronisms at times still color the way courts deploy the lAD. 
Corporations' early existence as "creatures of state law" is analyzed in 
the famous case of Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward,55 decided 
by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1819. (Of course, Dartmouth College was a 
nonprofit, educational corporation, rather than a business corporation, but 
the distinction was of no relevance to the Court's decision.) The central 
question in the case was whether the New Hampshire legislature, 
approximately fifty years after Dartmouth's incorporation, could alter a key 
term of its charter. 56 The Supreme Court wrestled with the question of 
whether the college, as a corporation, existed as an extension of the state 
government which chartered it. 57 The Supreme Court concluded the 
52See• e.g., Deborah A. DeMott, Perspectives on Choice of Law for Corporate Internal 
Affairs, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161, 161 (1985). 
/d. 
To many corporate lawyers, the "internal affairs" doctrine-the notion that only 
one state, almost always the site of incorporation, should be authorized to regulate 
the relationships among a corporation and its officers, directors, and share-
holders-is irresistible if not logically inevitable. Convenience and predictability 
of application, it is said, dictate that one body of corporate law govern internal 
affairs, while the most plausible state to supply that law is the state of 
incorporation, to whose legislative grace the corporation owes its legal existence. 
53See Frederick Tung, Before Competition: Origins of the Internal Affairs Doctrine, 32 J. 
CORP. L. 33,47 (2006). 
541d. at 46. 
55 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). Technically, the case addressed a charter for a charitable 
corporation, Dartmouth College, but the charitable versus business corporation distinction was not 
considered significant. 
561d. at 554. 
57New Hampshire inherited the charter authority from the British Crown upon the American 
Revolution-a fact which was not deemed of importance in the case. Id. at 559. 
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contrary was true: the charter creating the college was analogous to a state-
sanctioned private contract, for example a marriage contract. On this basis 
the Court concluded that ex post emendation by the State of New Hampshire 
would be unconstitutional under the Contracts Clause.58 
As illustrated in the Dartmouth College case, early American 
corporations were created by the grant of a formal charter from their home 
state's legislature. This historic reality spawned the understanding of corpo-
rations as "creatures of state law." Furthermore, in this period, corporations 
were understood to possess limited powers-Le., only those powers granted 
expressly in the charter. They applied for a charter from the state where they 
operated and were located. (Given the present state of global commerce, it is 
difficult to recall that as late as the mid or even late nineteenth century, most 
business was fundamentally local in nature.i9 Nor was the receipt of a 
charter a foregone conclusion. To increase their chances of obtaining a 
charter, promoters commonly cited some state interest that the company's 
commercial endeavors would advance.60 The idea of corporations "being" 
creatures of their incorporating state was supported, also, by the fact that 
states often contributed financing to these corporations, and placed represen-
tatives on their boards.6J Indeed, companies' separate legal personhood 
remained controversial; it was not self evident that their powers would be 
respected beyond the geographic boundaries of the state which chartered 
them.62 Against this backdrop, it is easy to see why corporations 
conventionally would have been conceived of as "creatures of state law." 
The legal and historic reality described herein, however, has long vanished. 
The assumptions about corporations it spawned are outmoded. 
Secondly, the "corporations as creatures of state law" notion ignores 
the fact that Congress could federalize corporate law for companies engaged 
58Id. at 696-704. 
59See. e.g., Tung, supra note 53, at 44-45; see also ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE 
VISffiLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 17-19 (1977) (discussing 
various production and merchant trends in the eighteenth and nineteenth century including the fact 
that "family remained the basic business unit"). 
~ung, supra note 53, at 50 ("Moreover, the vast majority of business corporations 
chartered before 1800 were engaged in the provision of services traditionally associated with 
government. Banks, water companies, and transportation companies-for the construction or 
operation of canals, turnpikes, and bridges-comprised the overwhelming majority of business 
corporations."). See also 2 JOSEPH STANCLIFFE DAVIS, EsSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF 
AMERICAN CORPORA nONS 3, 4 (1917) (discussing that seventeenth through nineteenth century 
corporations were generally organized for governmental or religious purposes). 
61See Tung, supra note 53, at 47. 
62 Id. at 48 ("As a creature of the sovereign, each business corporation was thought to exist 
only within the territorial borders of the sovereign. "). 
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in interstate commerce (i.e., most).63 The fact that Congress has declined to 
enact a comprehensive federal corporate law reflects a concrete political 
reality, not an ontological or taxonomic reality that validates corporations' 
existence in state law.64 
Finally, modern corporate legal theory undermines the rationality of 
conceiving corporations as belonging in any sense to the state where they 
charter. Under modern theory-as is reflected in Delaware's case law-
corporations are conceived of as a nexus of private contracts among the 
factors of production.65 They are conceived of as private actors-legal 
agents of the persons who capitalize them (shareholders) and govern them 
(the board), rather than legal extensions of the chartering state. As modern 
corporate legal theory privileges this private, contractualist view of 
corporations, it undermines the logic of corporations being "creatures of state 
law." There is no umbilical cord that would tie a dispute against a 
corporation to the forum of the chartering state. In this private, contractualist 
view, Delaware's corporate law is only one example of the many legal 
regimes that private parties choose from in attempting to promote the wealth 
arising from commercial transacting.66 This modern, contractualist view of 
the corporation and corporate law is also evident in the respect courts 
typically afford choice of forum provisions in corporate/commercial 
contracts.67 It is also reflected in the severability of choice oflaw and choice 
63U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the authority to "regulate Commerce with 
foreign Nations, and among the several States"). 
~s political resistance to centralized government authority over corporations is evident to 
the present, for example, in the backlash directed at the corporate governance-related provisions of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. See Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered 
sections of II, 15, 18,28, & 29 U.S.c.). Earlier on, such political resistance also meant that even 
the creation of the SEC was hotly contested and, indeed, postponed until the enactment of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See generally JOEL SEUGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN 
CORPORATE FINANCE 1-72 (3d ed. 2003) (describing the events and crises that led to the creation of 
the SEC). 
65For a recent statement of the nexus of contracts view of the fmn, in the context of an 
analysis of the lAD, see Larry E. Ribstein & Erin Ann O'Hara, Corporations and the Market for 
Law, 2008 U.ILL. L. REv. 661, 663-64. 
66Id. See also Jens Dammann, Adjudicative Jurisdiction and the Marketfor Corporate 
Charters, 82 TllL. L. REv. 1869, 1882-85 (2008) (discussing the inconvenience that European 
corporations would face if provided with the option of incorporating in their choice country); Onnig 
H. Dombalagian, Choice of Law and Capital Market Regulation, 82 TUL. L. REv. 1903,1912-17 
(2008) (explaining the corporate governance problems the European Union would face if 
corporations could choose their incorporation country); Robert B. Ahdieh, The (Misunderstood) 
Genius of American Corporate Law 8-17 (Emory Pub. Law Research, Working Paper No. 08-35, 
2(08), available at http://papers.ssrn.com!so13/papers.cfm?abstracUd=1105904 (reviewing the 
basic problems faced in American corporate governance). 
67 See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines,lnc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 594-97 (1991) (affirming the 
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of forum in these contracts.68 Again, in this modern corporate ontology, the 
state has no meaningful "generative" authority which it can use to pull.its 
corporate "creatures" back into its courtrooms. Hence choice of law and 
choice of forum are separate, distinct legal constructs. Choice of Delaware 
corporate law is simply indeterminate in regard to choice of forum. 
B. Judicial Deference to the Chartering State 
Tracking backward, the discussion above does not presume that the 
sovereignty-based concepts inherent in the early lAD were always irrelevant 
to courts' judgments about where claims should be adjudicated. To the 
contrary, even up to the early twentieth century, state courts commonly were 
unwilling to hear claims against foreign corporations.69 This understanding 
of comity, in which judicial deference was due to the state of incorporation, 
was litigated in Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., a 1933 decision of the U.S. 
Supreme Court.70 
In Rogers, the Court affirmed that New York's courts had acted within 
their discretion in refusing jurisdiction over the foreign corporate claims 
before them because the incorporating state (lllinois) was capable of 
providing an ample remedy.71 This conservative approach to comity 
reflected the fact that corporations only recently had been viewed as mere 
extensions of the state governments that" created" them. Basic principles of 
sovereign immunity and harmonious state relations were potentially at stake 
in courts "seizing" jurisdiction over complaints against foreign corpo-
rations.72 Amidst such early ambiguity, judicial abstention was the wiser 
course. 
right of private parties to establish by contract the procedural rights that they will have in subsequent 
disputes relating to their agreement-including choice of forum provisions). 
68For a historically rich analysis of the precedential roots and political implications of this 
trend in favor of respecting choice of forum, see Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Geography as a Litigation 
Weapon: Consumers, Forum-Selection Clauses, and the Rehnquist Court, 40 UCLA L. REv. 423 
(1992). Contrariwise, for discussion of Delaware's indifference to choice of forum provisions in the 
M&A documents in the Topps and Bear Stearns transactions, see infra notes 246-50 and 
accompanying text 
69 As Professor Tung notes, foreign courts tended to refuse jurisdiction over claims brought 
by in-state shareholders against out-of-state corporations. By refusing to hear the claims of "capital 
exporters," they could indirectly encourage in-state capital formation. Tung, supra note 53, at 68. 
7°288 U.S. 123 (1933). See also infra Part V .E.l (discussing Rogers' precedent and impact 
on the lAD). 
71Rogers, 288 U.S. at 131 (finding that "jurisdiction will be declined whenever 
considerations of convenience, efficiency, and justice point to the courts of the state of the domicile 
as appro~riate tribunals for the determination of the particular case"). 
2Sovereign immunity is defmed as "[al government's immunity from being sued in its own 
courts without its consent." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 766 (8th ed. 2004). 
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Nevertheless, even seventy-five years ago, this conservative approach 
to comity did not rise to the level of being a rule of judicial abstention. This 
was evident in Rogers itself, where the Supreme Court held that there were 
no formal limits on a state exercising its jurisdictional authority over foreign 
corporations, as such. This more expansive dimension of Rogers was 
subsequently affirmed by the Supreme Court, fifteen years later, in Koster v. 
(American) Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. 73 In Koster, the Court 
observed that Rogers stood only for the proposition that "the district court 
... was free in the exercise of a sound discretion [as part of its forum non 
conveniens analysis] to decline to pass upon the merits of the controversy 
and to relegate [the] plaintiff to an appropriate forum."74 Secondly, Koster 
affirmed that forum non conveniens analysis should not be driven by hard 
and fast formal legal concepts (e.g., basing forum choice on choice oflaw).75 
To the contrary, in Koster the Supreme Court held in adjudicating motions to 
dismiss under forum non conveniens, the most important concerns were 
pragmatic ones relevant to serving the litigants' best interests in the 
expedient and fair resolution of the case.76 
In this vein, as stated in Koster, the relevance of foreign law, even 
foreign corporate law, is merely one of many factors that a court may 
consider in ruling on whether to hear or dismiss the case. In the words of the 
Court: 
[T]he ultimate inquiry is where trial will best serve the 
convenience of the parties and the ends of justice. Under 
modern conditions corporations often obtain their charters from 
states where they no more than maintain an agent to comply 
with local requirements, while every other activity is conducted 
far from the chartering state. Place of corporate domicile in 
such circumstances might be entitled to little consideration 
under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, which resists 
formalization and looks to the realities that make for doing 
justice.77 
Koster remains the most authoritative word from the U.S. Supreme 
Court on the appropriate scope of judicial deference to the state of 
73330 U.S. 518 (1947). 
741d. at 528. 
751d. at 527. 
761d. at 527-28. 
77 Koster, 330 U.S. at 527-28. 
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incorporation inforum non conveniens motions. Hence, the logic of Rogers 
has been superseded by Koster. Judicial abstention in deference to the 
incorporating state is no longer the rule. Hence, the Court of Chancery's 
attempt to collapse choice of law and choice of forum-to keep forum in 
parallel proceedings based on the rationale that Delaware corporate law 
"belongs" in the Delaware courts-is not supported by U.S. Supreme Court 
precedent. 
Moreover, the recent Court of Chancery cases expounding Delaware's 
right to keep forum over disputes governed by Delaware corporate law even 
conflict with the Delaware Supreme Court's own forum non conveniens 
jurisprudence. That is, in Berger v. Intelident Solutions, Inc., the Delaware 
Supreme Court asserted Delaware's right to refuse to dismiss a claim 
governed by Florida corporate law, even where the case presented novel 
issues of Florida corporate law. 78 This Delaware Supreme Court precedent 
presents a challenge for the Court of Chancery's claims that Delaware has a 
superior, if not universal, right to keep cases governed by Delaware 
corporate law. 
C. Choice of Corporate Law 
Nevertheless, taken on its own terms, as a modern choice of law 
scheme, the lAD makes good sense. "Lex Incorporationis"-that is, the rule 
that the incorporating state's corporate law "sticks" to the corporation's 
internal affairs-provides a clear, stable rule for resolving conflicts of laws 
questions. Clarity in corporate choice of law is maximized by privileging the 
law of the state of incorporation.79 A different choice of law rule for 
corporate internal affairs-<me which relied on the place of the company's 
principal operations or headquarters, for example-would import more 
subjective and changeable factors into the choice of law analysis. This 
would yield less certainty for courts, investors, and third parties. 
As a choice of law regime, the lAD is codified in the Restatement 
(Second) of Conflicts of Laws.80 The Restatement sets forth the basic 
premise of the lAD-that the corporate law of the state of incorporation will 
govern a corporation's internal affairs irrespective of where any dispute is 
7BSee Berger v. Intelident Solutions, Inc., 906 A.2d 134,137 (Del. 2006) (holding, as part of 
its/orum non conveniens analysis, that "Delaware courts often decide legal issues---even unsettled 
ones-under the law of other jurisdictions"). 
79See DeMott, supra note 52, at 166-67 (discussing states' different approaches to applying 
local corporate law to foreign and "pseudo-foreign" corporations). 
BOSee REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OFCONfUcrS OF LAWS §§ 301-310 (1971). 
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litigated.8! Second, the Restatement sets forth an expansive definition of 
corporate internal affairs82 (consistent with that described above in Part 
II.A).83 
The Restatement also endorses the presumption of "singularity" in the 
lAD-i.e., that a corporation's internal affairs should be governed exclusively 
by the law of the state of incorporation. In this respect, conflicts analysis in 
corporate law is far more streamlined or even simplistic than the conflicts of 
laws regime applicable to most other areas of law. 84 
Singularity in choice of corporate law is also reflected in the Revised 
Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA). The MBCA provides that states 
complying with its choice of law dictates should refrain from "interfering" in 
other state's corporation laws-that is, from supplementing or amending 
foreign corporations' internal affairs provisions.85 This is set forth in section 
15.05(c) of the MBCA, which provides that a state shall not "regulate the 
organization or internal affairs of a foreign corporation authorized to transact 
business in this state. ,,86 Singularity in corporate choice of law allows 
corporate actors definitively to predict which state's laws will define their 
rights and obligations. Because parity is important in the treatment of 
shareholders, and predictability is especially important in commercial 
arrangements, singularity in corporate choice of law-as reflected in the 
lAD, the Restatement, and the MBCA-makes good sense. The singularity 
presumption in the lAD favors courts interpreting foreign corporation laws 
conservatively, in the fashion most faithful to the intent of the incorporating 
state. But respect for singularity in corporate choice of law (or even the goal 
of clarity in corporate law) does not mandate confining Delaware corporate 
law claims to the Delaware courts. The American civil justice system simply 
[d. 
8 lid. § 302 cmt. g. 
82See id. § 302 cmt. a. As set forth therein, internal affairs include but are not limited to: 
steps taken in the course of the original incorporation, the election or appointment 
of directors and officers, the adoption of by-laws, the issuance of corporate shares, 
preemptive rights, the holding of directors' and shareholders' meetings, methods of 
voting including any requirement for cumulative voting, shareholders' rights to 
examine corporate records, charter and by-law amendments, mergers, consoli-
dations and reorganizations and the reclassification of shares. 
83 See supra Part IlA. 
84.yne multifactor tests and state interests to be weighed under modem conflicts of law 
analysis stands in stark contrast to the abiding principle of singular choice of corporate law codified 
in the Restatement and enshrined in the lAD. For treatment of the modem, highly synthetic, multi-
factor analysis that characterizes modem conflicts analysis, see genera1ly SYMEON C. SYMEONlDES, 
THE AMERICAN CHOICE-DP-LAW REVOLUTION: PAST, PRESENT AND FuTURE (2003). 
8sMODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § IS.OS(c) (1984). 
861d. 
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does not presume that the geography of adjudication will match the locus of 
lawmaking. 
D. The Regulatory Competition Defensefor the lAD 
Claims of efficiency in modem corporate law are extremely forceful, 
although highly controversial.87 In most corporate law cases and com-
mentary, the term "efficiency" connotes wealth maximization-broadly 
conceived-and not just local cost savings. Those who believe in corporate 
law's efficiency, view singularity in corporate choice of law as being 
essential. For regulatory competition purposes, keeping each state's corpo-
rate laws separate and distinct promotes the selection of efficient, wealth-
enhancing corporate laws. 
However, so long as one accepts the difference between courts' 
applying law and making law, efficiency arguments based on the lAD do not 
mandate that a state's laws must be adjudicated only by that state's courts. 
So long as the distinction between adjudication and judicial lawmaking is 
accepted as a meaningful one (and the principle is fundamental in the 
American judicial system), and respected by the courts in general, the 
regulatory competition! efficiency claims for the lAD do not support 
Delaware's right to keep forum over the adjudication of Delaware corporate 
lawsuits. 
Nevertheless, the Court of Chancery is deploying the efficiency claims 
made for its corporate laws as part of its arguments for restricting Delaware 
corporate lawsuits to Delaware's courtrooms. To better evaluate this line of 
argumentation, the discussion below briefly reviews the claims made for 
Delaware corporate law's efficiency, and also for regulatory competition's 
effectiveness in producing wealth maximizing corporate laws. To sum-
marize the conclusion reached below: claims about Delaware corporate law's 
efficiency and efficient regulatory competition have been overstated. The 
evidence for corporate law's (and Delaware corporate law's) efficiency is 
largely indeterminate. Accordingly, it is daring but risky for the Court of 
Chancery to deploy efficiency arguments in this strategic manner to force 
forum in its favor. 
87This is especially true, as reflected in Delaware's case law, because modem corporate law 
is interpreted to be essentially just another species of commercial law, so that its objectives are 
construed narrowly as relating to maximizing the wealth of the transacting parties. See In re Cox 
Commc'ns, Inc. S'holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 647 (Dei. Ch. 2005) ("This is corporate law, after 
all, a species of commercial law .... "). For discussion of the normative implications of this view, 
in the context of going-private transactions by controllers, see Stevelman, supra note 43, at 906-07. 
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According to Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel, the singular 
choice of corporate law principle embodied in the lAD plays a crucial role in 
fostering efficiency and wealth maximization in corporate transactions.88 As 
they describe it, singularity in corporate choice of law is essential to the 
operation of state regulatory competition and hence the development of 
salutary, efficient, wealth-enhancing corporate laws.89 They write: "Because 
only one state's law governs the 'internal affairs' of a corporation, ... 
competition can be effective. ,,90 From this perspective, the lAD facilitates 
brand recognition and differentiation. It helps consumers of corporate law 
(e.g., managers, shareholders, and the securities markets) distinguish which 
brand they prefer as most likely to enhance their wealth. For those who 
believe that shareholders and the broader market are able to make such an 
informed, rational choice (Le., discern the quality of a firm's state corporate 
laws as part of their investment decision), singularity in corporate choice of 
law is a valuable feature of the system. 
Given the appeal of efficiency claims for investors, as in academic 
corporate law, it is not surprising that the Court of Chancery is employing 
them as ammunition in its recent choice of forum decisions. But the claims 
for there being macroeconomic wealth gains arising from Delaware corpo-
rate law-afortiori efficiency gains from requiring that Delaware's corporate 
law be adjudicated in Delaware-are quite shaky upon examination. 
Strong form claims for the efficient effects of regulatory competition 
in corporate law are encountering new challenges in scholarship and in 
practice. Although early scholarship showed promise, more than a decade of 
further empirical analysis has failed to substantiate strong evidence of 
Delaware corporate law's wealth maximizing effects.91 
88Prank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Pischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of 
Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 697-98 (1984). 
89ld. 
901d. at 697. 
91Michal Barzuza, Price Considerations in the Marketfor Corporate Law, 26 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 127, 129 (2004) (presenting evidence for theories of efficiency in corporate law and 
concluding that "[n]otwithstanding the extensive theoretical and empirical literature on this question, 
there is no consensus as to the desirability of the current system"); William I. Carney & George B. 
Shepherd, The Mystery of Delaware Law's Continuing Success, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1,9-11 
(collecting and analyzing decades of empirical studies about efficiency effects from Delaware 
chartering and concluding that "[t]he results of over twenty-five years of empirical work thus remain 
inconclusive"); Guhan Subramanian, The Influence of Antitakeover Statutes on Incorporation 
Choice: Evidence on the "Race" Debate and Antitakeover Overreaching, 150 U. P A. L. REV. 1795 
(2002) (finding mixed empirical data in study of whether corporate managers migrate to or away 
from states with strong antitakeover laws). 
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At least in recent years the securities markets seem driven more by 
herd behavior than fundamental, rational valuation. The recent, arguably 
very belated upheavals in the securities markets-in which the stock prices 
of almost all public companies, including major commercial and investment 
banks, plummeted precipitously and then remained breathtakingly volatile 
for months-undermine confidence that the securities markets rationally 
impound all publicly available, material information in a timely fashion. 
Skepticism is even more appropriate where the information made available 
to the market is technical, dynamic, and composite-as is the case with 
respect to a body of state corporate laws.92 
Finally, as Professor Mark Roe has demonstrated, federal law exerts 
pervasive limits on Delaware lawmakers' willingness to be adventurous in 
shaping the state's corporate laws as they might wish.93 According to Roe, 
the overhang of federal opprobrium, a fortiori express preemption, inhibits 
Delaware judges' and legislators' willingness to experiment in crafting 
maximally efficient corporate laws.94 Moreover, Delaware's status as the 
market leader in nationally significant corporate law would hinder its 
incentive to be experimental. Experimentation would unsettle Delaware 
corporate law's brand recognition and, hence, potentially its ongoing success 
in chartering. 
Because the lAD and regulatory competition in corporate law do not 
obviously enhance wealth, they also do not support Delaware's right to 
adjudicate Delaware corporate lawsuits. As such, these efficiency claims do 
not provide a basis for collapsing Delaware choice of law into Delaware 
choice of forum. 
E. Constitutional Claims for the lAD 
In crafting their corporation codes, California, New York, and a few 
other states have refused to accept the presumption of singularity in 
corporate choice oflaw.95 These states' corporate statutes include "foreign 
corporations" provisions designed to supplement those of the incorporating 
91fie capital markets' belated and seemingly irrational, or at least haphazard, response to 
upheavals in the credit and mortgage-backed securities markets and federal bailout of financial 
institutions would appear to undermine strong claims of market rationality and efficiency. 
93See Roe, supra note 3, at 646 (concluding that every corporate crisis "raises the threat or 
the reality that the issue will move from the states to Washington"). 
941d. at 597-98. 
95CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115 (West 2008); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 1317-20 (McKinney 
2003). 
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state.96 In line with the singularity principle in corporate choice of law, the 
Court of Chancery and Delaware Supreme Court recently rebuffed 
California's application of its preferred stock/foreign corporations provision 
to a Delaware incorporated issuer.97 The Delaware Supreme Court opined 
that the singular choice of law principle enshrined in the lAD is based on 
federal constitutional law principles.98 Upon review (as illuminated below), 
Delaware's constitutional law analysis falls short; its claims for the lAD 
having federal constitutional underpinnings are overblown. It does little to 
further Delaware's claims about the lAD and less to support Delaware's 
claims about forum. As was true of efficiency rationales, federal 
constitutional law principles provide an infirm footing for Delaware to keep 
forum over Delaware corporate lawsuits. 
The Delaware Supreme Court's opinion in VantagePoint Venture 
Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc.99 speaks volumes. But it says less about the 
constitutional basis of the lAD than it does about Delaware's concern for 
protecting its stature in corporate law. The VantagePoint litigation is 
notable, especially, because it illuminates Delaware's defensiveness about 
keeping control over its brand of corporate law. This concern is illustrated 
in the court's discussion of the lAD, and the presumption of singularity in 
corporate choice of law. This same defensiveness is also evident in the 
Court of Chancery's recent forum decisions in parallel proceedings, as 
discussed below in Part V. In light of their relevance to these forum rulings 
(which are the centerpiece of this article), the Delaware courts' decisions in 
VantagePoint are discussed immediately below. 
The facts in the recapitalization transaction under scrutiny in the 
VantagePoint decisions merit review. 1OO Section 2115 of California's 
corporation code establishes a class voting right for holders of preferred 
stock of closely held, foreign-incorporated issuers. 101 The statute's purpose 
96See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115(a) (West 2008); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1318 
(McKinney 2003). 
97VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc. (VantagePoint 11),871 A.2d 1108, 
1109-10 (Del. 2005). 
98Id. at 1115-18. In 2007, in Topps, the Court of Chancery also invoked the federal 
constitutional basis of the lAD-which is, once again, highly contestable. In re The Topps Co. 
S'holders Litig., 924 A.2d 951 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
99871 A.2d 1108 (Del. 2005). 
lOOSee VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc. (VantagePoint 11),871 A.2d 
1108 (Del. 2005); Examen, Inc. v. VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 (VantagePoint 1),873 A.2d 
318 (Del. Ch. 2005). 
10IImportantly, the preferred voting provision applies only to closely held issuers and only 
when they meet a demanding test for having significant California operations, revenues, or investors. 
CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115 (West 2008). The statute is discussed in depth in VantagePoint II, 871 
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is to ensure the enfranchisement of preferred shareholders in transactions 
where the incorporating state's corporation code does not afford them class 
voting rights. Most pertinently, under the DGCL, all the equity holders of 
Exarnen, Inc. would vote as one class in the merger at issue. In the process, 
the particular financial interests of the preferred holders might be overborne. 
This is precisely what California's class voting provision was intended to 
protect against. 
Had the California courts asserted their jurisdiction more aggressively, 
the dispute might have been resolved in California, and presumably to a 
different result. Instead, the corporate issuer, Examen, commenced the 
lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment in the Court of Chancery. 102 In this 
fashion, Examen sought to head off California's application of its preferred 
stock voting statute. 103 Five days later VantagePoint-a holder of Exarnen's 
preferred stock-filed a complaint in California Superior Court seeking 
affmnation that the preferred voting rights delineated in California's section 
2115 were applicable in the merger. 104 VantagePoint sought special relief to 
require the separate class vote of preferred holders, or damages in lieu 
thereof. \05 
In recognition of the parallel proceedings, the California court 
deferred to the Court of Chancery, where the litigation had first been 
commenced. But in deferring to the first-filed complaint, consistent with 
classic forum non conveniens doctrine, California virtually ensured 
Delaware's refusal to validate the application of section 2115. 
In resolving the choice of law question against the application of 
California's voting provision, the Court of Chancery first determined that the 
two states' voting regimes were in conflict, and hence mutually exclusive. 
(This result was not self evident.) 106 Next the Court of Chancery engaged in 
a straightforward application of the IAD. It held that Delaware's voting rules 
trumped California's-since Examen was a Delaware corporation. \07 
Despite VantagePoint's urging, the Court of Chancery deliberately refused to 
address whether the singular choice of law presumption in the lAD was 
mandated by federal constitutional law principles. Rather, in working 
A.2dat 1109-10. See also CAL. CORP. CODE § 171 (West 2(08) (defining foreign corporation). To 
qualify under the statute: (1) the average of the property factor, the payroll factor, and the sales 
factor as defined in the California Revenue and Taxation Code must be more than fifty percent 
during its last full income year; and (2) more than one-half of its outstanding voting securities must 
be held by persons having addresses in California. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115(a)-(b) (West 2(08). 
102VantagePoint 1,873 A.2d at 319. 
103/d. 
lO4ld. at 320. 
losld. 
II)6VantagePoint I, 873 A.2d at 323. 
107ld at 325. 
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through the conflicts of laws problem before it, the court cited the Delaware 
Supreme Court's decision in McDermott Inc. v. Lewis lO8-a landmark 
internal affairs decision. 109 
Contrariwise, on appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court accepted 
VantagePoint's constitutional law challenge. VantagePoint argued that 
Delaware was compelled either to uphold the application of California's 
preferred stock voting provision or, otherwise, to rule that it conflicted with 
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause and the Dormant 
Commerce Clause.110 In contrast to the Court of Chancery's reticence on this 
subject, the Delaware Supreme Court validated the federal constitutional law 
underpinnings of the lAD. It held that applying California's voting statute to 
the merger would conflict with due process-on the rationale that due 
process protects corporate actors' interest in being able to ascertain which 
standards will apply to transactions and conduct. III And the Delaware 
Supreme Court concluded that the Commerce Clause also barred applying 
California's section 2115 to the merger. ll2 (It also reiterated the old 
108531 A.2d 206 (Del. 1987). 
H19See VantagePoint /, 873 A.2d at 323-24 (discussing, in detail, the internal affairs 
principles validated in McDermott, 531 A.2d at 214-17). 
lilly antagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc. (VantagePoint Il), 871 A.2d 1108, 
1112-13 (Del. 2005). 
11I1d. at 1113. The "right-to-know"/due process defense of the lAD, however, is not as 
forceful as the Delaware Supreme Court's discussion would suggest. Certainly in public companies, 
the standards that actually apply to the rights and duties of directors, officers, and shareholders are 
extraordinarily multilayered and context-specific-as the discussion in supra Part ill demonstrates. 
The multilayered nature of these intersecting bodies of law that govern directors', officers', and 
shareholders' rights and expectations is why, for example, corporate directors hire expert, expensive 
corporate lawyers who understand not only the subtleties of the corporate case law and the 
intricacies of the statutes, but also the federal securities laws and regulations, and the requirements 
promulgated by the stock exchanges. Beyond the context of closely held, unregistered finns, the 
multiplicity of standards that make up modern corporate governance undennines a strong right-to-
know/due process defense of the lAD. 
I12VantagePoint /1,871 A.2d at 1113 (quoting McDermott, 531 A.2d at 217) ("Under the 
Commerce Clause, a state 'has no interest in regulating the internal affairs of foreign corporations. "'). 
See also id. at 1115-17 (discussing the singular choice of law feature of the lAD as being a 
necessary feature of stability and efficiency in corporate law, consistent with Commerce Clause 
rationales). Despite the Delaware Supreme Court's reasoning, it is difficult to accept that allowing 
the application of California's supplementary voting statute would impose a meaningful burden on 
corporate transacting, at least in a transaction where a vote of the common holders is already a 
prerequisite of the transaction's consummation. Furthennore, there are many legal protections and 
requirements which are layered onto corporate transactions by the Williams Act and these are not 
presumed invalid under the Donnant Commerce Clause. The same analysis would apply to the 
voting requirements arising from the New York Stock Exchange's requirements (which are indirectly 
subject to the SEC's and hence Congress's authority). Given the many layers of procedural rules that 
infonn public company transactions-which are not found impennissibly to burden interstate 
commerce-it is hard to justify the view that California's "closely-held" preferred voting stock rule 
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"creatures of state law" rationale for the lAD in prohibiting the class vote 
contemplated by California's voting provision.)lI3 
For our purposes, the substance, i.e., the merits of the supreme court's 
constitutional law discussion in VantagePoint is mostly beside the point. 1l4 
What is most revealing and important for our purposes is the remarkable 
overbreadth of the Delaware Supreme Court's constitutional law excursus. In 
effect, the constitutional law discussion in VantagePoint is effectively an 
advisory opinion. This is because Delaware's views about the U.S. Constitu-
tion cannot bind any state other than Delaware. At least as a matter of 
fonnal law, the discussion of federal constitutional law principles in 
VantagePoint was gratuitous. The overbreadth in VantagePoint is note-
worthy and revealing because the Delaware Supreme Court has a well 
deserved reputation for deciding only the case before it and avoiding 
unnecessary legal controversies--consistent with Delaware's best interests. 
Nevertheless in VantagePointthe Delaware Supreme Court seized upon the 
framework of the lAD to protect the integrity of Delaware law from possible 
intrusion by other states (in this case, California). 
Hence, the actual purpose of the Delaware Supreme Court's 
constitutional law discussion in VantagePoint was to signal to other states, 
including California, that Delaware would "go to the mat" to defend the 
singular choice of law principle inherent in the lAD. In this regard 
VantagePoint illuminates Delaware's concern about maintaining its 
preeminence in corporate law (as do the forum rulings analyzed in Part V). 
As VantagePoint illuminates, however, Delaware's appeal to federal 
constitutional law cannot resolve Delaware's concerns about the future 
preeminence of its corporate law. 
The discussion immediately below shifts focus to analyze the 
increasing pressure on Delaware corporate law arising from the growth of 
federal corporate law. Part V returns to Delaware's increasing concern about 
choice of forum and the interstate adjudication of Delaware corporate law 
claims. 
would have such an impennissible effect, or that the same rule applied to public companies would 
be an impennissible burden on interstate commerce in conflict with the Dormant Commerce Clause. 
113Jd. at 1114-16. The Delaware Supreme Court cited the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in 
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America for the "creature of law" concept, but CTS does little to 
elaborate on the content of that assertion in a way that would give substance to the claim. See CTS 
Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 89-90 (1987). 
114For an excellent discussion, see Glynn, supra note 19, at 108-23 (describing Delaware's 
defensive response to enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and its expression in the choice of law 
controversy in the VantagePoint litigation). 
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N. FEDERAL THREATS TO DELAWARE'S PREEMINENCE 
IN CORPORATE LAW 
A. Eradication Through Express Preemption 
89 
Explici~ federal preemption is the most salient, though not the most 
pressing threat to Delaware corporate law. There is no question that pre-
emption is legally possible. Under the Commerce Clause, Congress has 
authority to regulate almost any aspect of interstate corporate affairs, 115 and 
legal scholars have at times enthusiastically supported the enactment of 
federal minimum corporate law standards.1I6 Nevertheless, federal 
disinclination to preempt state corporate law dates back to the enactment of 
the Securities Act of 1933 117 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.118 
Rather than preempting state law, Congress has provided for a system of 
dual (federal and state) regulation of corporate governance. In enacting 
federal proxy laws, for example, Congress avoided legislating the subject 
matter that shareholders could vote on-leaving that to the states' corporate 
laws. 119 Even in 1968, in enacting the Williams Act and establishing federal 
tender offer laws, Congress focused primarily on promoting disclosure. It 
left entirely to state regulation the scope and nature of boards' freedom to 
resist unwanted bids. 
The federal courts have also sought to avoid preempting state 
corporate law. This is evident in the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretations of 
section lO(b) and Rule lOb_5. 12o For example, in the landmark case of Santa 
Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,I21 the Court declined to extend the federal 
antifraud prohibition to allegedly unfair acts and transactions which did not 
involve misrepresentation. 122 
But preemption may be becoming more palatable to Congress. For 
example, the pressure of globalization may make uniform, federal standards 
of American corporate law more attractive. Congress's enactment of the 
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA) is 
IISNote how broadly interstate commerce is construed under the Commerce Clause; 
Congress would not be confined only to companies meeting the definition of public companies 
under sections 12 and 15( d) of the Securities Exchange Act. 
116Cary, supra note 20, at 701-02. 
11715 U.S.C. § 77a (2006). 
IIS!d. § 78a. 
119See Auer v. Dressel, 118 N.E.2d 590, 592-93 (N.Y. 1954) (establishing what matters 
shareholders have a right to vote on-as a question of state rather than federal law). 
120See 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006); 17 c.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (2008). 
121430 U.S. 462 (1977). 
122!d. at 479. 
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illustrative. 123 In SLUSA, Congress preempted most private investor class 
actions alleging fraud under state law. 124 Only at the last minute did 
Congress pull back to avoid preempting lawsuits alleging misrepresentation 
by corporate fiduciaries. 125 Without the last minute "Delaware carve-out" (as 
it has come to be known), an essential piece of state corporate law, including 
Delaware's "fiduciary duty of disclosure," would have been preempted by 
federal law . 126 
B. Eclipse or Marginalization 
Delaware is more likely to lose preeminence in corporate law as a 
result of being gradually eclipsed or marginalized by the accretion offederal 
corporate laws, SEC regulations, and stock exchanges' listing standards. On 
top of these, "best practices" proffered by shareholder activists may go far in 
blurring the distinctiveness of Delaware's brand of corporate law. 127 This 
thick "supra-layer" of national corporate law standards might persuade 
corporate managers to opt for the convenience of chartering in their home 
state. 
1. Federal Laws and SEC Regulations 
Upon the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX),128 and 
the SEC's implementing regulations, federal law reached a new high water 
mark in areas of corporate law traditionally governed by the states. In 
actuality, the accretion of federal "corporate laws" had been ongoing for 
123Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 
3227 (1998). 
124ld. § 16(b) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77p (1998». 
1251d. For discussion of SLUSA's scope, see Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. 
Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 82-88 (2006). 
I26Kahan & Rock, supra note 42, at 1587-88. Nevertheless, the federal disinclination 
towards express preemption is the rule rather than the exception; and this rule was illustrated once 
again in Congress's enactment of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005. See Class Action Fairness 
Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
127Technically these are outside federal law, but their force and utility is shaped by the 
federal shareholder proposal rule under SEC Rule 14a-8. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2008). For a 
sirniiar emphasis on "brand recognition" as a mechanism supporting Delaware's sustained 
preeminence in corporate law, see Omari Scott Simmons, Branding the Small Wonder: Delaware's 
Dominance and the Market/or Corporate Law, 42 U. RICH. L. REv. 1129 (2008). 
128Sarbanes_Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered 
sections of II, 15, 18,28, & 29 U.S.C.). 
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decades, as scholars have noted. 129 A few examples suffice to illustrate this 
ongoing expansion of federal corporate law. 130 
In 1977, Congress enacted the books and records provisions of the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), ther~by establishing federal 
standards for public companies' record keeping and accounting.131 The 
FCP A also requires public companies to devise and maintain systems of 
internal controls sufficient to safeguard against insider misappropriation and 
other illicit payments. 132 The FCP A, together with the antifraud prohibitions 
in the securities laws, have broadly supplemented public company directors' 
fiduciary duty of care, disclosure and oversight, as defined by state law. 133 
Similarly, by the late 1970s, the federal ban on insider trading had largely 
outstripped the complementary state fiduciary ones.134 The former simply 
proved more useful and adaptable in most cases. 135 
129For commentary on the increasing role of federal securities law in areas identified 
traditionally under the rubric of internal corporate affairs, see, e.g., J. Robert Brown, Jr., The 
Irrelevance of State Corporate Law in the Governance of Public Companies, 38 U. RICH. L. REv. 
317, 335-38 (2004); Robert Charles Clark, Corporate Governance Changes in the Wake of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A Morality Tale for Policymakers Too, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 251, 281-86 
(2005); John C. Coates IV, The Goals and Promise of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 21 J. EcON. PERSP. 
91,91-96 (2007); Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light 
Reform (and It Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REv. 915, 941-74 (2003); Roberta S. Kannel, 
Realizing the Dream of William O. Douglas-The Securities and Exchange Commission Takes 
Charge of Corporate Governance, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 79, 98-123 (2005); Roberta Romano, The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1529-
43 (2005); Joel Seligman, The New Corporate Law, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1,36-37 (1993); Faith 
Steveiman, Foreword, Corporate Governance Five Years After Sarbanes-Oxley: Is There Real 
Change?, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 475, 4S6-92 (2008); Robert B. Thompson, Corporate 
Governance After Enron, 40 HOUs. L. REV. 99, 104-06 (2003). For an argument for enhanced 
international securities laws, see Roberta Romano, The Need for Competition in International 
Securities Regulation (Yale Int'l Ctr. for Fin., Working Paper No. 00-49, 2(01), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.comlabstract=278728. 
13'For commentary on the complementary of federal and state standards in corporate 
governance by two sitting Delaware jurists, see Myron T. Steele, Sarbanes-Oxley: The Delaware 
Perspective, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 503, 506-11 (2008); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Breaking the 
Corporate Governance Logjam in Washington: Some Constructive Thoughts on a Responsible Path 
Forward, 63 BUS. LAW. 1079, 1099-1100 (2008). 
131Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b) (2002). 
I32See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 
1278-82 (1999) (noting the rise of the monitoring board in the 199Os); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise 
of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market 
Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1520-23 (2007) (reviewing the fact that monitoring boards became 
a safe harbor in the 1980s). 
133 See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Board of Directors and Internal Control, 19 CARDOZO L. 
REv. 237,242-44,254-56 (1997). 
I34See Diamond v. Oreamuno, 248 N.E.2d 910,914 (N.Y. 1969). 
13SSee generally STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, SECURITIES LAW: INSIDER TRADING 7-23 
(1999) (reviewing insider trading and discussing the effects of the Diamond case). 
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By 1982, with the SEC's enactment of integrated disclosure, and 
certainly by 1988 when the U.S. Supreme Court decided Basic Inc. v. 
Levinson, 136 federal law was defining what information shareholders needed 
to evaluate their company's status and managers' performance.137 In 
addition, an increasing number of lawsuits which might have been brought 
as breach of fiduciary duty claims, were reformulated as securities law 
misrepresentation claims. As a result, shareholder litigation under the 
federal securities laws has edged out many shareholder claims that would 
otherwise have been brought under state fiduciary law. 
Federal enforcement by the SEC and the Department of Iustice (DOJ) 
has also had a seminal influence in shaping the obligations of public 
company managers and advisers. The federal courts, the SEC, and 
occasionally the DOJ have liberally exercised their authority to define and 
punish misconduct by corporate directors,138 officers,139 general counsel,l40 
corporate financial advisers, 141 and public company auditors. 142 These 
federal authorities have often taken the lead in defining and punishing 
, wrongful conduct by these parties. In these respects, Congress,143 the SEC 
136485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
137In Basic, the Court held that companies involved in the early stages of merger 
negotiations might have to make public disclosure thereof as necessary to avoid half-truths or false 
denials, even if such publicity were destructive to the immediate interests of the company's 
shareholders. Id. at 236-41. See also Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance, Bad 
Economics: An Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 1059, 1087-89 
(1990). 
138See, e.g., In re WoridCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 628 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
I 39See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Former Enron Chief Financial Officer 
Andrew Fastow Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy to Commit Securities and Wire Fraud, Agrees to 
Cooperate with Enron Investigation (Jan. 14, 2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/ 
2004/January/043rm_019.htm. 
I40See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Former McAfee General Counsel Indicted 
for Stock Options Backdating (Feb. 27, 2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/can/press/ 
2007/2007_02_27 _roberts.indictment.press.html (describing indictment of former general counsel of 
McAfee, Inc. in connection with stock options backdating in 2000 and 2002). 
141 See, e.g., Federal Court Approves Global Research Analyst Settlement, Litigation Release 
No. 18,438 (Oct. 31, 2003), available at http://www.sec.govllitigationllitreleases/lr18438.htm 
(describing federal court's approval of the historic $1.4 billion settlement of SEC enforcement 
actions against ten of nation's top investment banks). 
142See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 101,116 Stat. 745,750 (2002) 
(establishing a "Public Company Accounting Oversight Board"); see also Press Release, U.S. Dep't 
of Justice, KPMG to Pay $456 Million for Criminal Violations in Relation to Largest-Ever Tax 
Shelter Fraud Case (Aug. 29, 2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2005/Augustl 
05_ag... 433.html (discussing KPMG's involvement in a tax fraud that provided for over $2.5 billion 
in evaded taxes). 
143Congress enacted standards for public company auditors' responsibilities in detecting and 
reporting fraud in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 302(a)(5)(B), 116 Stat. 745, 777 (2002) (codified at 15 U.S.c. § 78j-
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(both through rulemakingl44 and enforcement actionsI45), and the federal 
courts have established a broad array of corporate governance-related rules 
and standards--ones which are at least as authoritative and efficacious as 
those in state corporate law. l46 
2. Listing Standards from the Exchanges and the NASD 
Even prior to SOX's enactment, the stock exchanges and the National 
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) were imposing increasingly 
stringent governance standards on listed companies.147 After SOX, these 
federally initiated forms of "self-regulation" have grown in scope and 
become more exacting in their requirements. For example, the NASD and 
the exchanges upgraded their requirements for having independent directors 
on listed companies' boards and special committees-including audit, 
nominating, and compensation committees.148 In addition, they adopted 
l) (amending section lOA of the Securities Exchange Act which details the audit requirements of 
issuers of fmancial statements by independent public accountants). See also id. § 307 (codified at 
15 U.S.c. § 7245) (promulgating rules governing conduct by general counsel); Corporate and 
Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002, 18 U .S.c. § 1514A (2002) (providing for whistleblower 
protection for employees of publicly traded companies). 
144Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act 
Release No. 47,276, Exchange Act Release No. 8185, Investment Company Act Release No. 25,919 
(Aug. 5, 2oo3) (codified in 17 C.F.R. § 205 (2003}). For discussion, see Lisa H. Nicholson, Sarbox 
JOTs Impact on Subordinate In-House Counsel: Between a Rock and a Hard Place, 2004 MICH. 
ST. L. REv. 559, 566-75. 
14Sln re Sterling Homex Corp. Sec. Litig., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) 'lI 95,904 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); In re Cooper Cos., [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. (CCH}'lI 85,472 (1994); In re W.R. Grace & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 39,157, 67 SEC 
Docket 1240 (Sept. 30, 1997). 
146See Thompson, supra note 129, at 107 (remarking that state corporate law's response to 
the 2001-2003 spate of frauds was remarkably muted). 
147See, e.g., Audit Committee Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 34-42,266 (Jan. 31, 
2oo0) (codified in scattered sections of 17 C.F.R.); NAT'L ASS'N CORP. DIRS., REPoRT OF THE 
NACO BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION ON AUDIT COMMITIEES: A PRACTICAL GUIDE (2ooo) 
(recommending ways for audit committees to become more effective ); Blue Ribbon Comm. on 
Jmproving the Effectiveness of Corp. Audit Comms., Report and Recommendations of the Blue 
Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees, 54 Bus. LAW. 
1067, 1072-76 (1999) (listing recommendations for strengthening, improving effectiveness, and 
providing for greater accountability of audit committees); Seligman, supra note 129, at 52 (noting 
that in 1977, the SEC, through a rule change in the NYSE listing requirements, mandated that listed 
companies have audit committees composed solely of independent directors). 
148See NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 303A (2008) (providing corporate 
governance rules approved by SEC). For a discussion of the layering of federal statutory, SEC, and 
listing standards' provisions affecting the structure of reporting companies' boards of directors, see 
Holly J. Gregory, Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP-Comparison ofSarbanes Oxley, SEC and listing 
Rule Provisions Related to the Composition and Functioning of the Board of Directors of a 
Publicly Traded-Company (as of June 20, 2007), in DIRECTORS' INsTITUTE ON CORPORATE 
GoVERNANCE, at 353 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series No. B-1694, 2oo8). 
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objective and more stringent standards for defIning whether directors met the 
standard of "independence" for serving on such committees.149 
Delaware has broadly endorsed independent director ratifIcation as a 
mechanism to "cure" conflict transactions. This applies to takeover 
situations, self-dealing transactions, executive compensation awards, and 
even judgments to quash derivative suits. 150 (In contrast, the cleansing force 
of independent director ratifIcation is given only partial effect in controllers' 
self-dealing transactions, but Delaware may be softening this standard.)151 
Notwithstanding the pro-managerial tilt in Delaware corporate law, one 
would expect that the jurisprudential test for director independence would be 
a stringent one-in light of the centrality of independent director ratifIcation 
in Delaware corporate law. Instead Delaware has tolerated a relatively lax 
standard of director independence-~me which arguably has ignored many 
kinds of inhibitions to directors' capacity for objectivity. 152 In this crucially 
important area of state corporate law-that is, in defIning meaningful, 
enforceable criteria for "independent" directors-federal laws and standards 
have outstripped Delaware's. The federally initiated independence 
149The New York Stock Exchange and Ihe NASD have promUlgated highly influential 
standards governing Ihe criteria for "independent" directors. See NYSE, Inc., Listed Company 
Manual §§ 303A.O 1-.02 (2008); NYSE, CORPORATE GoVERNANCE RUlE PROPOSALS REFtEcnNG 
RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE NYSE CORPORATE ACCOUNTABD.JTY AND LIsTING STANDARDS 
COMMITIEE AS ApPROVED BY THE NYSE BOARD OF DIRECfORS (2002), http://www.nyse.com/ 
pdfslcorp~ov_pro_b.pdf. The NYSE has proposed a change Ihat would require companies to 
"disclose affIrmative reasons for its fIndings Ihat its independent directors are, in fact, 
'independent.'" Stock Exchanges: NYSE Seeks Rule Change on Director Independence, 9 Corp. 
Governance Rep. (BNA) 6 (Jan. 2, 2(06). This change was proposed to address Ihe concern Ihat 
some listing companies were using only Ihe specifIc tests for independence and neglecting Iheir 
obligation to make Iheir own assessment of a director's independence. Id. Material relationships 
include "commercial, industrial, banking, consulting, legal, accounting, charitable and familial 
relationships, among olhers." NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 303A.02(a) cmt. (2008). 
150See Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400, 404 (Del. 1987); Cooke v. Oolie, No. 11,134, 
2000 WL 710199, at *13 (Del. Ch. May 24, 2000), reprinted in 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 609, 627 
(2001). For criticism of this approach, see 'I. Robert Brown, Jr., Disloyalty Without Limits: 
"Independent" Directors and the Elimination of the Duty of Loyalty, 95 Ky. LJ. 53, 98-100 (2006). 
151Kahn v. Lynch Cornmc'n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1116 (Del. 1994). See also 
Stevelman, supra note 43, at 911-12 (arguing Ihat freezeout transactions by controllers should be 
governed by Ihe entire fairness standard unless Ihere was an auction or market check prior to 
independent directors' approval of Ihe controllers' bid). Delaware's broad acceptance of independent 
director ratifIcation, in Ihe face of its lax standard for independence, is a sore spot, an area where 
Delaware corporate law is vulnerable to Ihe charge of insuffIciently addressing agency costs. 
152See, e.g., Beam ex. reI. Mar1ha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 
1040, 1051-55 (Del. 2004); In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 923-25, 947 (Del. 
Ch. 2003); Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 26-31 (Del. Ch. 2002); In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative 
Litig., 731 A.2d 342,356-61 (Del. Ch. 1998), afJ'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Brehm v. Eisner, 
746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). 
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requirements promulgated by the NASD and the exchanges l53 are super-
seding Delaware's criteria for defining director independence and ensuring 
their service consistent with shareholders' best interests. 154 
3. Shareholder Activist Initiatives 
In recent years, the dynamics of shareholder activism in the area of 
corporate governance refonn have changed substantially. Highly motivated, 
organized institutional investors (including activist hedge funds and public 
and private pension funds) have successfully employed mass publicity and 
(federal) proxy-based shareholder proposal campaigns to press for change. 155 
Organizations like RiskMetrics (fonnerly Institutional Shareholder Services) 
and The Corporate Library have sought to capitalize on such institutional 
investor activism. 156 These forces are operating outside of the traditional 
framework of state corporate law-that is, without amendment to the DGCL 
and separate and apart from the judicial development of fiduciary standards. 
In prior periods, corporate directors, officers, and their advisers could more 
153See Gregory, supra note 148, at 355-76 (summarizing "the corporate governance 
requirements relating to the composition and function of the board of directors of companies" 
subject to the listing standards). 
154Delaware is mostly likely tolerating this because it may stand to lose chartering business 
from seeming too rigid in defining independence criteria. In effect, Delaware is ducking the issue: 
in the face of these federally initiated standards, Delaware's jurisprudence has neither conformed nor 
upgraded its own criteria for concluding that directors are disinterested and appropriately situated to 
opine on the fairness of conflicted transactions involving corporate insiders. In practice, however, as 
public companies alter their boards and committees to comply with the listing standards' 
independence requirements, the composition of public companies' boards and key board committees 
will change to reflect the letter and hopefully the spirit of the exchanges' new, objective director 
independence criteria See, e.g., Brown, Jr., supra note 150, at 100; Donald C. Clarke, Three 
Concepts of the Independent Director, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 73,103-04 & n.126 (2007); Lisa M. 
Fairfax, Sarbanes-Oxley, Corporate Federalism, and the Declining Significance of Federal 
Reforms on State Director Independence Standards, 31 OHIO N.V. L. REv. 381,395 (2005). 
155For a discussion of the influence of activist hedge funds, see Thomas W. Briggs, 
Corporate Governance and the New Hedge Fund Activism: An Empirical Analysis, 32 J. CORP. L. 
681,696-700 (2007); Alon Brav et al., The Returns to Hedge Fund Activism (European Corp. 
Governance Inst. Working Paper, Paper No. 098, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com!abstract= 
llll778. 
15~or recent commentary on the role of corporate governance rating agencies and, in 
particular, RiskMetrics' (previously known as Institutional Shareholder Services) role as an advisor 
to shareholders in voting proposals, see Tamara Belinfanti, The Proxy Advisory and Corporate 
Governance Industry: The Case For Increased Oversight and Control, 14 STAN. J.L. Bus & FIN. 
(forthcoming 2009); Robert Daines et aI., Rating the Ratings: How Good are Commercial 
Governance Ratings? (Stanford Law & Econ. Olin Working Paper No. 360, 2008), available at 
http://ssrn.com!abstract=1152093. 
96 DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW [Vol. 34 
easily insulate themselves from shareholders' demands and expectations. 157 
And the Delaware courts' interpretation of the business judgment rule has 
facilitated directors' insulation from shareholders' demands. 15s 
Nevertheless, such shareholder activism may be achieving a new 
critical mass. In a recent speech, Martin Lipton argued just this. According 
to Mr. Lipton, leading activist institutional investors have become so adept at 
forcing their agendas on public companies that they are destroying the older 
framework of state corporate governance for public companies. 159 If Mr. 
Lipton is correct, then Delaware's preeminence in corporate law may truly be 
in jeopardy. 
In actuality however, the chances are good that Mr. Lipton has 
overstated the case for an incipient "revolution" in public company corporate 
governance. Moreover, if such a revolution is on the way, it is not a war that 
Delaware can win by fighting choice of forum battles. To the contrary, in 
regard to both the intellectual integrity and accepted preeminence of its 
corporate law, Delaware has much to lose from forcing the forum issue. 
V. CHOICE OF FORUM: 
HORIZONTAL THREATS TO DELAWARE'S PREEMINENCE 
Professors Eisenberg and Miller have recently evaluated the phenom-
enon of Delaware companies becoming subject to corporate and commercial 
lawsuits in non-Delaware forums. 160 While their results are preliminary, the 
professors present evidence of some degree of claims flight even in M&A 
lS7For judicial notation of that fact, including acknowledgment of the high-proftle influence 
of Institutional Shareholder Services in affecting votes in reporting companies, see, e.g., Hewlett v. 
Hewlett-Packard Co., No. 19,513-NC, 2002 WL 818091, at *8 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30,2002), reprinted 
in 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 326, 340 (2003) (stating that "it was widely known that Institutional 
Shareholder Services, Inc .... played a critical role [in the proposed HP-Compaq merger,] because 
several institutions usually follow [Institutional Shareholder Services'] recommendations"). 
IS8See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 35fKi1 (Del. Ch.1998), 
afJ'd in pan, rev'd in pan sub nom. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). 
IS9Martin Lipton, Keynote Address at The 2008 Directors Forum of The University of 
Minnesota Law School: Shareholder Activism and the "Eclipse of the Public Corporation": Is the 
Current Wave of Activism Causing Another Tectonic Shift in the American Corporate World? 5-8 
(June 28, 2(08) (discussing shareholder activism and its effect on public company boards of 
directors). 
I~eodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, Ex Ante Choices of Law and Forum: An 
Empirical Analysis of Corporate Merger Agreements, 59 V AND. L. REv. 1975 (2006) [hereinafter 
Eisenberg & Miller, Ex Ante Choices of Law and Forum]; Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. 
Miller, The Flight to New York: An Empirical Study of Choice of Law and Choice of Forum 
Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies' Contracts (NYU Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 08-13, 
2(08), available at http://papers.ssm.com!so13/papers.cfm?abstracUd=1114808 [hereinafter 
Eisenberg & Miller, The Flight to New York]. 
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lawsuits involving Delaware public companies. 161 This Part fIrst analyzes 
the practical incentives and legal doctrines that shape plaintiffs' forum 
choices in Delaware corporate lawsuits. It then analyzes Delaware's strategic 
deployment of choice of forum doctrine to corral high-profIle cases in its 
courtrooms. 
A. Incentives to File Suit Outside of Delaware 
Why might plaintiffs be motivated to fIle Delaware corporate law 
claims in foreign forums? 
First, plaintiffs and their counsel might reasonably be concerned that 
Delaware judges have an anti-plaintiff/pro-corporate bias. As "race for the 
bottom" believers postulate, such bias would foreseeably result from the fact 
that corporate managers, and not shareholders, select the state of incorpo-
ration. Furthermore, such anti-plaintiff sentiment was openly expressed by 
the Court of Chancery, for example, in In re The Topps Co. Shareholders 
Litigation162 and In re Cox Communications Inc. Shareholders Litigation. 163 
The concern about plaintiffs' perception of bias is sufficiently palpable that 
the Court of Chancery openly addressed it in the Topps decision. In a 
lengthy footnote in Topps, the court stated defensively that "[t]here is no 
rational basis to believe that stockholder-plaintiffs cannot secure important 
relief in the Delaware courtS."I64 Of course, if such a fear was truly 
irrational, the Court of Chancery would not have felt compelled to address it 
at length. 
Delaware judges' general disfavor towards shareholder litigation 
would also reflect the general popular disfavor towards class action litiga-
tion. This disfavor has been reflected not only in the media, but also in 
Congress's enactment of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005,165 the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995/66 and SLUSA.167 
161Eisenberg & Miller, Ex Ante Choices of Law and Forum, supra note 160, at 1983. See 
also Larry E. Ribstein, Delaware, Lawyers, and Contractual Choice of Law, 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
999, 1025 (1994) (concluding that choice-of-law statutes "have potentially wide-ranging 
implications"). 
162924 A.2d 951, 961 (De\. Ch. 2(07) ("Random results may be good for plaintiffs'lawyers 
who can use the uncertainty factor that comes with disparate forums to negotiate settlements of cases 
that might otherwise be dismissed as unmeritorious. "). 
163879 A.2d 604, 640-42 (De\. Ch. 2(05). See also Stevelman, supra note 43, at 857-59 
(discussing the cash-out merger in Cox and the Delaware Court of Chancery's decision). Both Cox 
and Topps are discussed at greater length below. 
164See Topps, 924 A.2d at 961 n.39. 
165Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 9 (2005) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
l~b. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
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Especially in light of Delaware's concern about federal preemption, it would 
be reasonable for shareholder-plaintiffs to worry that Delaware judges would 
favor corporate defendants and look to dismiss shareholders' complaints 
whenever possible. 
The early professional training of most Delaware corporate judges 
would also reinforce this bias. Prior to their tenure on the Court of Chancery 
or Delaware Supreme Court, most Delaware judges were members of 
corporate/defense-side Wilmington law firms. Hence, they would have 
received their formative training in corporate-oriented, defense-friendly 
settings. Such a pro-corporate/pro-defense orientation would be reinforced if 
the judges were interested in returning to these lucrative corporate law 
practices after their tenure on the bench. The same would be true if they 
intended to seek an academic appointment at a law school because academic 
opinion has largely disfavored most shareholder litigation. 168 
It is also possible that non-Delaware corporate law firms are seeking 
to draw litigation out of Delaware and into their own state's courts. It stands 
to reason that New York's and other large cities' major corporate law firms-
especially firms commonly involved in negotiating M&A deals-would be 
increasingly unwilling to share fees with their Delaware counterparts. Even 
before the current economic downturn, competition between "big city" law 
firms had become much more intense. 169 As noted by the court in Topps, 
New York and other states are seeking to compete with Delaware's share of 
business and commercial litigation. 170 Like several other states, New York 
has established a specialized business and commercial court to attract more 
corporate cases into the state's courtrooms.171 These trends signal that the 
167Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (1998). 
168Por a more measured view of contemporary derivative suits, see Thompson & Thomas, 
supra note 49, at 134 ("Shareholder litigation is the most frequently maligned legal check on 
managerial misconduct within corporations. "); see also Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, 
The Public and Private Faces of Derivative lAwsuits, 57 VAND. L. REv. 1747, 1749 (2004) 
("Contrary to earlier studies, we do not find evidence that that [sic] these cases are 'strike suits' 
yielding little benefit. "). Por an openly derisive account of the plaintiffs' bar and the effects of 
shareholder litigation, see, e.g., Elliott J. Weiss & Lawrence J. White, File Early, Then Free Ride: 
How Delaware lAw (Mis)Shapes Shareholder Class Actions, 57 V AND. L. REv. 1797, 1855-56 
(2004). 
1690n the economic downturn's effect on corporate law frrms, see Jonathan D. Glater, 
Billable Hours Giving Ground at lAw Firms, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3D, 2009, atAl. Porcommentary 
on increased competition among large law frrms, see generally Marc Ga1anter & William Henderson, 
The Elastic Tournament: A Second Transformation of the Big lAw Firm, 60 STAN. L. REv. 1867 
(2008) (reviewing legal competition and large law firm growth while explaining that there is an 
expected change in the makeup of large law frrms). 
170See In re The Topps Co. S'holders Litig., 924 A.2d 951, 964 n.43 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
171 A testament to this is the energy the New York courts are devoting to upgrading the 
state's business courts, as noted by Vice Chancellor Strine in his Topps decision. See id. (citing 
Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Forums of the Future: The Role of Specialized Courts in Resolving Business 
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Delaware courts and Delaware corporate lawyers are facing greater 
competition in the area of their core competence: high-profile M&A and 
fiduciary loyalty litigation involving Delaware public companies. 
Competition between Delaware and non-Delaware plaintiffs-side law 
firms may also be propelling some corporate cases into other jurisdictions. In 
Law reforms intended to reduce strike suits have made it more difficult for 
shareholder-plaintiffs to win financial recoveries, even in meritorious cases. 
If plaintiffs' firms are scrambling to stay profitable, they might rationally be 
less amenable to consolidating their cases within a single forum. The result 
would be a splintering of corporate shareholder claims into parallel 
proceedings in different forums, i.e., precisely what Delaware is concerned 
about. 
The changing complexion of M&A deals may also be redirecting 
some lawsuits to other jurisdictions. In recent years, banks and private 
equity firms have acquired tremendous clout in M&A practice. Unlike 
managers of Delaware corporations, these constituencies have no particular 
nexus to or affinity for Delaware or its corporate law-and no preference for 
litigating in Delaware. Delaware has no special expertise in the area of 
banking law or general commercial litigation. 173 If the credit-related and 
contractual dimensions of M&A disputes increasingly predominate over 
fiduciary issues, this could erode the preference for litigating in Delaware. 174 
Two more points are important to the discussion at this point. First, it 
is not necessarily true that plaintiffs determine the forum for litigating 
corporate lawsuits. Although this article generally assumes that plaintiffs are 
initially determining forum, corporate defendants have considerable room to 
maneuver in determining which forum will hear Delaware corporate 
lawsuits. As was the case with Examen, Inc.'s motion for declaratory 
injunction filed in the Court of Chancery (as described above), prospective 
defendants may seek a declaratory injunction regarding the interpretation of 
a particular corporate law rule, charter, or bylaw provision. They may also 
commence litigation to enforce or contest the enforceability of a corporate 
transaction or takeover defense. In addition, defendants will commonly have 
Disputes, 61 BROOK. L. REV. I (1995); Kahan & Kamar, supra note 23, at 710; Judith S. Kaye, 
Refinement or Reinvention, The State of Reform in New York: The Courts, 69 ALB. L. REV. 831, 
839-40 (2006». 
172See Private Securities Litigation Refonn Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 
(1995) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.c.). For popular commentary, see Eleanor Clift, 
Capitol Letter: Waiting for the Next Shoe to Drop, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 8, 2002, http://www.news 
week.comlidl63423. 
173Eisenberg & Miller, Ex Ante Choices of Law and Forum, supra note 160, at 1983, 2002-
09. 
174For analysis of the legal and financial issues which have roiled recent private equity 
transactions, see Davidoff, Private Equity, supra note 27. 
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power to remove shareholder claims from state to federal court under either 
diversity or supplemental jurisdiction. Once in federal court the defendants 
may seek to transfer the litigation from one circuit to another in a different 
state. Finally, corporate defendants may succeed in altering the locus of 
shareholder litigation as a result of ajorum non conveniens motion. 
In sum, it is erroneous to assume that plaintiffs have ultimate control 
over deciding where corporate litigation proceeds. In fact, given their 
greater financial resources and the above described legal means, it is 
arguable that corporate defendants routinely have the upper hand in 
controlling the locus of corporate litigation. This has profound normative 
implications for corporate law. For example, corporate defendants' power to 
call forum may blunt the equilibrating force that would otherwise result from 
plaintiffs' having alternative forum choices. It would also blunt the force of 
claims that shareholder-plaintiffs are unfairly engaging in "forum shopping." 
The final point of relevance here is that even where shareholder-
plaintiffs file suits governed by Delaware corporate law outside of Delaware, 
they may be doing so because it is simply less costly or otherwise more 
practically convenient for them. They may not have an express intention to 
avoid litigating in Delaware. 
B. Alternative Tribunals, Alternative Procedural Rules 
1. In General 
As mentioned previously, although the lAD mandates that the 
incorporating state's corporate laws will apply in the adjudication of 
corporate law claims irrespective of where they are litigated, it does not 
mandate applying the incorporating state's rules of civil procedure. This 
means that plaintiffs' lawyers would rationally consider the impact of other 
jurisdictions' procedural rules before determining where to file a complaint. 
Delaware judges surely anticipate this. Logically, they would consider the 
potential of "claims flight" in applying their own rules of procedure and 
corporate laws. In this manner, regulatory competition (irrespective of its 
ultimate effects) operates not only at the front-end legislating/chartering 
stage, but also at the "back-end" of corporate law in settling up through 
litigation (i.e., the development of judicial standards through shareholder 
litigation). 
2. Juries 
As a court of equity, trials in the Court of Chancery are decided by the 
bench. In contrast, in some other jurisdictions, Delaware shareholder-
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plaintiffs would have their complaints heard by juries, as is often the case in 
civil litigation. This potentiality was broached in Rapoport v. Litigation 
Trust of MDIP Inc. 175 In Rapoport, Vice Chancellor Parsons opined that 
"'Delaware corporate citizens often find it advantageous to be based in a 
state where business disputes can be resolved without a jury trial .... 111176 
The vice chancellor did not further explain the rationale for his opinion. 
Most likely he meant that potential corporate defendants, in his view, 
preferred to avoid the potential for a jury trial. This mayor may not be true 
as a general matter. There is in fact scant evidence, however, that juries are 
biased against corporate defendants. Researchers have generally been 
impressed by the professionalism of juries. They have found them to be 
neither punitive toward corporations nor overly generous towards plaintiffs 
as a general matter. 177 
3. In re Cox and Plaintiff-Attorneys' Fees 
The decision in In re Cox Communications, Inc. Shareholders 
Litigation,178 decided by the Court of Chancery in 2005, illustrates the 
interconnectedness of substantive corporate law standards and the rules of 
civil procedure. In this respect, it illuminates how the limits of the lAD 
would influence forum choice. 
Just as important, the decision in Cox illustrates the Court of 
Chancery's own ambivalent/modulated treatment of plaintiffs' lawyers. In 
specific, the Court of Chancery excoriated the conduct of the plaintiffs' 
lawyers in the Cox Communications freezeout transaction, although it 
ultimately approved the award of a reasonable fee to them. This modulated 
treatment of the plaintiffs' lawyers in the Cox decision most likely reflects 
the Court of Chancery's desire to reduce the incentive for plaintiffs' lawyers 
to try for higher fees in settlements that might be approved elsewhere. 179 In 
this respect, Cox illuminates how Delaware's own doctrine is rendered more 
moderate by the shareholder-plaintiffs' option to litigate in other states or in 
federal court. 
17SNo. 1035-N, 2005 WL 3277911 (Del. Ch. Nov. 23, 2005). 
176ld. at *7 (quoting Asten v. Wangner, No. 15,617-NC, 1997 WL 634330, at *3 (Del. Ch. 
Oct. 3, 1997». 
177Por discussion and citation to studies of juries' decisions in civil cases noting the 
widespread misconception of pro-plaintiff bias, see Bassett, supra note 5, at 388-91. 
178879 A.2d 604 (Del. Ch. 2005). 
179In Cox itself there were claims filed not only in Delaware, but also in Georgia, which is 
where the headquarters of Cox Communications was located. See w. at 608 & n.6 (observing that in 
all, thirteen complaints were filed in Delaware and three in Georgia). 
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Both of these points-the interconnectedness of substance and 
procedure in corporate law, and the modulating effect of plaintiffs' having 
choices in regard to forums-are central to this article's thesis. Because they 
are both illuminated by the Cox decision, that decision is discussed in further 
detail immediately below. 
In Cox, the court surveyed the fiduciary doctrines pertaining to 
freezeout transactions and concluded that they are confusing and ineffi-
cient. 180 According to the opinion, adherence to the entire fairness standard 
of review for freezeouts encourages plaintiffs' lawyers to file nonmeritorious 
suits to obtain fees from controllers. 181 The court reasoned that controllers 
pay the fees (as part of settlements) in order to avoid the larger costs 
associated with discovery under the entire fairness standard of review. 182 
Thus, in Cox, the court drew a direct link between (what it regarded as) 
dysfunctional substantive doctrine (i.e., adherence to the entire fairness 
standard) and dysfunctional procedural standards (i.e., allowing fee 
reimbursement when plaintiffs filed complaints against negotiable 
freezeouts). To promote the integrity of its fiduciary standards and to deter 
abusive filings by plaintiffs' lawyers, the court endorsed a new fee 
reimbursement standard for freezeouts. Under the new standard, plaintiffs' 
lawyers cannot anticipate receiving any fees when they file complaints 
against freezeout transactions that are still negotiable. 183 According to Cox, 
the new fee limit should apply even if a special committee obtained a higher 
price from the controller while the litigation was pending-as was true in 
Cox itself. l84 In Cox, the court expressly stated its view that the 
commencement of the litigation had contributed little or nothing to the better 
price obtained for the minority shareholders. 185 
The discussion above is intended to illustrate the Court of Chancery's 
view of the interconnectedness of procedural standards (e.g., discovery and 
fee reimbursement standards) and substantive fiduciary law standards. This 
interconnectedness reveals the threat to Delaware arising from the potential 
out of state adjudication of Delaware corporate lawsuits. Because the lAD 
does not make Delaware's procedural rules stick, the impact of different 
procedural rules (in out-of-state adjudication) in Delaware corporate lawsuits 
18°Id. at 642-48. 
181Id• at 605-06. 
1820efendants pay these sums, purportedly, because they rationally wish to avoid the even 
greater costs and burdens of discovery. 
183COX, 879 A.2d at 640-42. 
184Id. at 640 (discounting plaintiffs' argument that they were solely responsible for the 
increased final merger price). 
185Id. at 640-41. 
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is of concern to the Delaware courts. It represents a genuine loss of control 
on their part. The loss of control may be felt directly: from other courts 
adjudicating the claim. Or it may be felt indirectly, in Delaware's need to 
adjust ex ante to the potential for claims flight. Either way, the loss of 
control would, reasonably be experienced as a kind of diminishment to be 
eliminated if possible. 
Returning to the specifics in Cox, the outcome of the fee dispute 
illuminates how Delaware is modulating its own treatment of plaintiffs' 
lawyers in order to discourage claims flight. 186 In Cox, the Court of 
Chancery excoriated the conduct of plaintiffs' lawyers in filing complaints 
against negotiable freezeouts. Nevertheless, it signed off on the plaintiffs' 
lawyers fee of $1.275 million-roughly $500 per hour, plus expenses. 187 
Why did it do so, after having rebuked them so forcefully? It is possible 
that, as a matter of legal process, the court believed that it was only fair to 
apply the new, more conservative fee standard after giving notice to the 
plaintiffs' bar. But probably not; it is not uncommon for the Court of 
Chancery to update its standards and apply the newly updated standard to the 
case before it. More likely, the court was sensitive not to go too far in 
alienating the plaintiffs' lawyers who had brought the case before them. 
Indeed, that is precisely the point. If Delaware alters its fee doctrine 
or other procedural rules in a manner that seems punitive or excessively 
harsh to shareholder-plaintiffs and their lawyers, then claims will go 
elsewhere-possibly to Delaware's detriment. Claims flight could also result 
if Delaware's fiduciary standards were applied in a way that seemed 
excessively harsh to plaintiffs. Shareholder-plaintiffs and their lawyers 
might hope that other courts would be unwilling to strictly construe 
corporate laws that seemed excessively partisan. 
And, again, the "open door" offorum choice creates a feedback loop. 
The lAD's shortcomings (its failure to encompass procedural rules as part of 
corporate choice of law), in tandem with the modem, liberal rules of 
personal jurisdiction, influences Delaware's own decision making in corpo-
rate lawsuits, as Cox illuminates. If Delaware corporate law is perceived to 
be excessively pro-defendant, plaintiffs will have a strong incentive to 
litigate elsewhere. If it is perceived to be overly generous to shareholder-
plaintiffs, corporations will look to other states in chartering, and to other 
tribunals in defending against Delaware corporate lawsuits.188 The Delaware 
186Jd. at 641-42. 
187 Cox, 879 A.2d at 642. 
I 88For discussion of defendants' ability to alter the site of litigation through motions based on 
forum non conveniens, removal (to federal court), and transfer of venue, see Bassett, supra note 5, at 
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courts are surely well aware of this as they decide corporate cases. Hence 
litigants' choices regarding forum, in combination with the limits of the lAD, 
results in a more balanced Delaware corporate law doctrine. 
C. Delaware's Traditional Approaches 
to Resolving Forum Disputes 
A twin doctrinal framework governs equitable claims contesting 
forum in Delaware. Under the heading of forum non conveniens, a well-
established jurisprudence governs motions to stay claims flrst flIed in 
Delaware. For claims which are second flIed in Delaware, in the alternative, 
the relevant framework is the so-called McWane doctrine, which favors the 
grant of a stay. In both instances, motions contesting forum are judged 
against pragmatic considerations, including the court's access to proof and 
witness testimony, and other practical considerations bearing on the court's 
ability to resolve the dispute fairly and expediently in the parties' interest. 
To be clear: in these equitable claims the defendant is not contesting the 
court's formal jurisdiction to hear the claim. That the court has the requisite 
personal and subject matter jurisdiction to proceed is not in question in these 
cases. 
1. First-Filed Actions-Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine 
The most important principle in Delaware's forum non conveniens 
jurisprudence is that plaintiffs' forum choices are given great weight. 189 To 
prevail in a motion to stay or dismiss a frrst-flIed claim based onforum non 
conveniens, a defendant must demonstrate that it would suffer 
344. 
189"Delaware courts consistently uphold a plaintiffs choice of forum except in rare cases 
.... " Berger v. Intelident Solutions, Inc., 906 A.2d 134, 135 (Del. 2006). In Berger, the Delaware 
Supreme Court refused to grant dismissal, notwithstanding the fact that the court is aware of what 
"often happens in corporate litigation, [that] all of the documents and all of the likely witnesses in 
th[e] dispute are located outside of Delaware. In this case, the relevant evidence [was] all in 
Florida." [d. at 136. See also Mar-Land Indus. Contractors, Inc. v. Caribbean Petroleum Ref., L.P., 
777 A.2d 774, 777-78 (Del. 2001) ("The standards that govern a motion to dismiss on grounds of 
forum non conveniens are well-established under Delaware law. A plaintiff seeking to litigate in 
Delaware is afforded the presumption that its choice of forum is proper and a defendant who 
attempts to obtain dismissal based on grounds of forum non conveniens bears a heavy burden. ") 
(citations omitted); Ison v. E.!. duPont de Nemours & Co., 729 A.2d 832,835 (Del. 1999) (stating 
that in order for a defendant to have an action dismissed onforum non conveniens grounds it must 
show "that this is one of those rare cases where the drastic relief of dismissal is warranted based on a 
strong showing that the burden of litigating in this forum is so severe as to result in manifest 
hardship to the defendant"). 
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"overwhelming hardship" if the court were to proceed. 190 Hence it is only in 
truly exceptional circumstances that the Delaware courts have granted a stay 
on forum non conveniens grounds. (Delaware's "classic" forum non 
conveniens jurisprudence is only applied to ftrst-filed claims.) Again, it is 
the contesting party-the defendant requesting the stay-who has the burden 
of demonstrating it would suffer overwhelming hardship if the court were to 
proceed. 191 Though linguistic infelicity suggests the court should balance 
the equities in adjudicatingforum non conveniens motions, this is not how 
the doctrine has developed. l92 Judicial balancing is expressly proscribed in 
Delaware's forum non conveniens jurisprudence. 193 
The Delaware Supreme Court has recognized the following factors as 
relevant to a court's decision making in forum non conveniens motions. 
Collectively, they are referred to as the Cryo-Maid factors: 194 
(1) the relative ease of access to proof; (2) the availability of 
compulsory process for witnesses; (3) the possibility of the 
view of the premises; (4) whether the controversy is dependent 
upon the application of Delaware law which the courts of ... 
[Delaware] more properly should decide than those of another 
jurisdiction; (5) the pendency or nonpendency of a similar 
action or actions in another jurisdiction; and (6) all other 
practical problems that would make the trial of the case easy, 
expeditious and inexpensive. 195 
190Berger, 906 A.2d at 135 (advising that "[t]he trial court recited the applicable legal 
standard and acknowledged that dismissal should be granted only in rare cases where a defendant 
would be subjected to overwhelming hardship"). 
1911d. 
1925ee, e.g., Chrysler First Bus. Credit Corp. v. 1500 Locust Ltd. P'ship, 669 A.2d 104, 107 
(Del. 1994) (en banc) (reiterating that "a defendant must establish that one or more of the Cryo-Maid 
factors actually causes such significant hardship or inconvenience"). 
193 Aveta, Inc. v. Colon, 942 A.2d 603, 607 n.7 (Del. Ch. 2008). In Avera, a 2008 Court of 
Chancery decision, the court stated that "Delaware does not conceive of theforum non conveniens 
doctrine as a mere 'balancing of convenience test.'" Id. at 608. 
194In Ison, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the consistency and stability of Delaware's 
forum non conveniens doctrine. As described therein, the court's "analysis has been guided since at 
least 1964 by what has come to be known as the Cryo-Maid factors." Ison, 729 A.2d at 837. 
1951d. at 837-38 (quoting Taylor v. LSI Logic Corp., 689 A.2d 1196, 1198-99 (Del. 1997». 
See also General Foods Corp. v. Cryo-Maid,Inc., 198 A.2d 681, 684 (Del. 1964) (establishing the 
factors to consider when addressing aforum non conveniens issue). As is evident from the text, 
many of these factors are mostly irrelevant to corporate law cases, including M&A litigation and 
other fiduciary disputes in corporate law. For example, there is almost never any need to view a 
physical premises. Documents can easily be transported nationally without undue inconvenience or 
expense and, in any event, there is no reason to assume the documents would be located in 
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These factors are consistently employed by the Delaware courts in 
adjudicating forum non conveniens motions. 196 Based on these factors, 
defendants'forum non conveniens motions are almost universally denied in 
Delaware.197 Indeed, the Delaware court's general disposition to go forward 
and hear the claim before it applies even where later-filed, substantially 
similar proceedings are ongoing elsewhere. 
The great respect afforded plaintiffs' choice of forum by the Delaware 
courts is expressed in Mar-Land Industrial Contractors, Inc. v. Caribbean 
Petroleum Refining, L.p.,198 decided by the Delaware Supreme Court in 
2001. In Mar-Land the court declared, "Our jurisprudence makes clear that, 
on a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens, whether an alternative 
forum would be more convenient for the litigation, or perhaps a better 
location, is irrelevant."I99 Similarly, in 2006, in Berger v. Intelident 
Solutions, Inc. ,200 the supreme court stated that "Delaware courts consistently 
uphold a plaintiffs choice of forum except in rare cases .... ,,201 
Importantly, as earlier noted, Berger demonstrates that the Delaware 
Supreme Court has been no less inclined to keep forum merely because 
another state's corporate law governs the dispute. In Berger, the Delaware 
Supreme Court denied the defendant's requested stay notwithstanding that it 
concluded the case presented novel issues of Florida corporate law. 202 
The Delaware Supreme Court's expansive approach to keeping forum 
over disputes governed by other states' corporate law presents a dilemma for 
the Court of Chancery vis-a-vis its recent rulings in parallel proceedings.203 
Delaware. Access to witness testimony has also been mostly irrelevant to choices among forums in 
corporate law cases, i.e., for the most part it is has had no practical significance in the courts' 
determinations in favor of one jurisdiction or another. Because these concrete, logistical factors are 
mostly irrelevant to the forum determinations at issue in these cases, they have not received 
significant treatment herein. 
1965ee, e.g., Berger, 906 A.2d at 135; Mar-Land Indus. Contractors, Inc. v. Caribbean 
Petroleum Ref., L.P., 777 A.2d 774, 778 (Del. 2001); Ison, 729 A.2d at 837-38. 
197 See Aveta, Inc., 942 A.2d at 608 (laying a legal foundation consistent with prior supreme 
court precedent, the court advised that the critical issue in deciding the issue of forum non 
conveniens is whether the defendant can show that any or all of the relevant considerations rise to 
the level of the defendant's suffering "significant, actual hardship" if the claim proceeds). 
198777 A.2d 774 (Del. 2001). 
1991d. at 779. 
200906 A.2d 134 (Del. 2006). 
201 ld. at 135 (quoting Taylor v. LSI Logic Corp., 689 A.2d 1196, 1198 (Del. 1997». 
202ld. at 137. 
203See, e.g., County of York Employees Ret. Plan v. Merrill Lynch & Co., No. 4066-VCN, 
2008 WL 4824053, at *2-5 (Del. Ch. Oct. 28, 2008); In re The Topps Co. S'holders Litig., 924 A.2d 
951,958-61 (Del. Ch. 2007); Ryan v. Gifford, 918 A.2d 341,348-51 (Del. Ch. 2007). But see In re 
Bear Stearns Cos., S'holder Litig., No. 3643-VCP, 2008 WL 959992, at *5-8. (Del. Ch. Apr. 9, 
2008), repn'nted in 33 DEL. I. CORP. L. 515, 522-28 (2008) (deferring to New York even though 
Delaware fiduciary law governed). 
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It undercuts the legitimacy of the Court of Chancery's claim that other courts 
should defer to Delaware when Delaware corporate law governs the dispute. 
Consistent with the most elementary principles of comity, Delaware cannot 
adopt a stance of "what's yours is mine and what's mine is mine" as the 
hallmark of its forum jurisprudence. 
2. Second-Filed Actions-The McWane Presumption 
Favoring a Stay 
Again, the counterpart of Delaware keeping forum in first-filed claims 
is the McWane doctrine or presumption.204 McWane and its progeny 
establish a presumption favoring the stay of later-filed claims where earlier-
filed, substantially similar proceedings are ongoing before a qualified 
tribunal.205 
Under McWane, the Cryo-Maid factors are again crucial. As applied 
to later-filed claims, however, balancing is allowed and the presumption is in 
favor of staying the lawsuit.206 The presumption in favor of granting the stay 
rests on principles offairness and efficiency. The objective is to resolve the 
dispute in a timely and cost efficient manner, consistent with the litigants' 
best interests. 
But there are also broader, institutional interests at stake in the 
. McWane presumption. The McWane presumption promotes the perceived 
legitimacy of the judicial system by preventing unseemly judicial "turf 
wars." It also avoids the unseemliness of potentially conflicting judgments. 
These concerns are usually discussed under the (admittedly vague) rubric of 
"comity." The reliance on strict filing chronology to resolve equitable forum 
disputes-which is codified both inforum non conveniens jurisprudence and 
the McWane presumption-has provided a clear, objective standard. In this 
regard it has promoted the interests of the litigants in particular disputes and 
the interests of the judicial system. 
Nevertheless, neither forum non conveniens nor McWane juris-
prudence is a perfect fit for resolving forum disputes where there are 
substantially identical shareholder lawsuits ongoing in different forums. 
204McWane Cast Iron Pipe Corp. v. McDowell-Wellman Eng'g Co., 263 A.2d 281, 283 
(Del. 1970). 
2051d. 
206See id. (affmning the rule that "litigation should be confined to the forum in which it is 
first commenced, and a defendant should not be pennitted to defeat the plaintiffs choice of forum in 
a pending suit by commencing litigation involving the same cause of action in another jurisdiction of 
its own choosing"). 
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McWane itself did not address this setting. 207 Nor has the Delaware 
Supreme Court had occasion to rule in this context. In this slight juris-
prudential gap, the Court of Chancery is improvising, developing a new 
body of doctrine that partially expands upon, and partially deviates from, the 
so called Cryo-Maid factors. These new standards are examined 
immediately below. 
D. The Court of Chancery's Post-McWane Jurisprudence 
A point of clarification is in order here. Where there are multiple 
ongoing shareholder claims in different forums but Delaware has the first-
filed claim, Delaware applies its forum non conveniens jurisprudence, which 
as earlier described almost inalterably leads to its keeping the case. 
The new wrinkle is where substantially identical shareholder actions 
are pending in different forums, and Delaware has the later-filed claim The 
new standards the Court of Chancery is devising to address this precise 
procedural setting are discussed hereinafter. 
In determining whether to go forward with a later-filed claim where 
parallel proceedings are pending, the Court of Chancery is improvising. 
Some of the criteria it is employing are drawn from the Cryo-Maid factors. 
Others are new, and of the Court of Chancery's own devise. The emerging 
framework is remarkably flexible: more subjective than objective, and hence 
highly malleable to accommodate the court's preference. In almost all the 
recent, salient cases (M&A and fiduciary loyalty breach cases involving 
Delaware public companies), the court has deployed its new standards to 
keep forum and proceed with the litigation. The sole and fascinating 
exception is the litigation contesting the sale of Bear Stearns to J.P. Morgan, 
where Delaware arguably had more to lose from deciding the case, than it 
did from allowing New York to go forward (as described in Part V.F).208 
207The McWane presumption reflects the Delaware courts' respect for plaintiffs' choice of 
forum and the desire to prevent defendants from countermanding plaintiffs' forum choice by filing 
subsequent related (responsive) claims in their (the defendants') preferred forum See, e.g., Biondi v. 
Scrushy, 820 A.2d 1148, 1159 n. 21 (Del. Ch. 2003) (stating that in regard to first-filed claims, 
McWane "was concerned with preventing defendants from defeating 'the plaintiffs choice offorum 
in a pending suit by commencing litigation involving the same cause of action in another jurisdiction 
of its own choosing"') (quoting McWane, 263 A.2d at 283). 
208The litigation contesting the sale of Bear Steams to J.P. Morgan is the exception in this 
regard. In that case the Court of Chancery stayed its jurisdiction in deference to the New York 
Supreme Court (where the litigation had been first filed and was ongoing, as discussed in the text). 
See In re Bear Stearns Cos., S'holder Litig., No. 3643-VCP, 2008 WL 959992, at *1 (Del. Ch. 
Apr. 9, 2008), reprinted in 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 515, 516 (2008). 
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1. Less Deference to Strict Filing Chronology 
The Court of Chancery is increasingly rejecting filing chronology as 
the standard for resolving whether to go forward or stay the claim before it in 
parallel proceedings. Filing chronology has been the doctrinal lynchpin 
under both forum non conveniens analysis (where it has overwhelmingly 
favored the court going forward with first-filed actions), and under McWane 
(where a presumption in favor of a stay applies to later-filed claims).209 
Disregarding filing chronology in forum motions involving parallel 
proceedings opens the door to the courts' exercise of far more subjective 
criteria, of course. And the rejection of filing chronology is a key move in 
Delaware's effort to keep forum in high-profile Delaware corporate lawsuits, 
especially because in high-stakes M&A and self-dealing cases substantially 
equivalent shareholder claims are commonly filed in different forums in 
rapid succession. In light of the common proximity in filing time, the Court 
of Chancery has opined that privileging filing chronology would be unduly 
formalistic and rigid in these cases. Indeed, it has stated that preferring the 
first-filed claim encourages a "race to the courthouse" and unprofessional 
lawyering by plaintiffs' counsel. 
In this mode, the Court of Chancery has disregarded elapses of hours, 
days, and in one case even three weeks-holding that the claims were 
effectively contemporaneously filed. For example, in the Bear Steams 
litigation, the Delaware claim was filed three days after the New York 
claim.2IO In the Topps litigation, the Delaware claim was filed one day after 
the New York claim.2l1 In In re IBP, Inc. Shareholders Litigation,212 IBP 
filed in Delaware five hours after Tyson filed in Arkansas.213 And, in Ryan 
v. Gijford,214 the Delaware fiduciary breach claim was filed three weeks after 
federal and state law claims were filed in California.215 In each of these 
instances the Court of Chancery opined that the claims were in effect 
contemporaneously filed, and rejected filing chronology as an appropriate 
heuristic for resolving the dispute over forum. Furthermore, although 
209To clarify, again, Delaware is rejecting filing chronology in situations where it has the 
second- or later-filed claim. It is also not more amenable to letting go of first-filed claims, consistent 
with its forum non conveniens jurisprudence. 
2IOBear Steams, 2008 WL 959992, at *3, reprinted in 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. at 520. 
211/n re The Topps Co. S'holders Litig., 924 A.2d 951, 957 (Del. Ch. 2(07) ("The first New 
York Action was filed a day before the first Delaware Action. "). 
212No. 18,373, 2001 WL 406292 (Del. Ch. Apr. 18,2(01). 
213ld. at *1. 
214918 A.2d 341 (Del. Ch. 2(07). 
2lSld. at 347. 
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Delaware had the later-filed claim in each of these instances, it refused to 
stay its jurisdiction in every case except Bear Steams. 
Certainly, there is room to argue that where claims are filed in close 
proximity employing filing chronology to resolve forum disputes seems 
inflexible or even arbitrary. But from another perspective, this inflexibility 
or rigidity promotes the positive goals of predictability and objectivity. 
Predictability benefits litigants; objectivity benefits the legal system. 
Relying on filing chronology to resolve forum disputes in parallel 
proceedings allowed plaintiffs and defendants to be reasonably sure of where 
the litigation would proceed. Once a reasonably sound and comprehensive 
claim had been filed against a transaction, the plaintiffs and defendants could 
begin to prepare their cases accordingly. Relying on filing chronology to 
resolve forum also minimized motions practice in corporate litigation 
(thereby reducing unnecessary, costly litigation). The certainty arising from 
relying on strict filing chronology also limited the expense for plaintiffs who, 
as a result, would not have to initiate multiple proceedings challenging the 
same transaction. Hence, the rejection of filing chronology to decide forum 
seems inefficient. It therefore looks especially bad for Delaware because 
Delaware's jurisprudence has championed the importance of clear, 
predictable rules of decision. 
Employing filing chronology as the standard to resolve forum also lent 
greater objectivity to forum disputes. It prevented the courts from relying on 
potentially self-serving criteria to resolve where the litigation would proceed. 
As an objective test, it also minimized the potential for unseemly judicial 
turf wars and the possibility of conflicting judgments. In these respects, 
relying on strict filing chronology promoted confidence in the judicial 
system's integrity. 
Delaware's present disinclination to respect filing chronology in forum 
disputes in parallel proceedings thus raises cause for concern. As other 
courts become more aware of Delaware's new, more aggressive approach to 
resolving (and keeping) forum in parallel proceedings, there are likely to be 
more "standoffs" between Delaware and other jurisdictions. Delaware risks 
being perceived as a bully in keeping forum over later-filed claims. Hence, 
rejecting filing chronology as part of a strategy to keep high-profile 
Delaware corporate lawsuits in Delaware is risky-both for the state and its 
corporate law. 
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2. Favoring the Better-Drafted Complaint 
The Court of Chancery is increasingly refusing to stay where it 
concludes that the complaint before it is better drafted.216 The court has 
warned against a rule favoring fIrst-filed complaints on grounds that a rule 
preferring the earlier-filed complaint, as a general matter, encourages hasty 
drafting, sloppy lawyering, and bad outcomes for Delaware corporate 
shareholders.2I7 
For example, in refusing to grant the stay requested in Biondi v. 
Scrushy, Vice Chancellor Strine opined that the earlier-filed Alabama 
complaint was substandard compared to the one later filed in Delaware.2I8 
In the vice chancellor's words: "The public policy interest favoring the 
submission of thoughtful, well-researched complaints-rather than ones 
regurgitating the morning's fInancial press-would be disserved by granting 
a stay .... ,,219 Biondi is representative of the Court of Chancery's new 
emphasis on the quality of the pleadings as a criterion for resolving forum 
disputes in parallel proceedings. 
To be sure, this approach has some validity. If the Court of Chancery 
was confIdent that the earlier-filed complaint would be dismissed as legally 
insufficient, it would ill serve the plaintiffs' interest to stay the Delaware 
proceedings (assuming an adequately drafted complaint had been filed in 
Delaware). There is, however, a real danger that the Court of Chancery will 
put too fIne a point on the matter. Most importantly, it has not endorsed a 
standard of "legal insufficiency" in deciding to go forward despite there 
being an earlier-filed complaint pending elsewhere. Nor is it clear that 
Delaware would ascertain whether the plaintiffs in the alternative forum had 
been given leave to amend their complaint or were in the course of so 
doing.22o 
216See, e.g., Biondi v. Scrushy, 820 A.2d 1148, 1153-54 (Del. Ch. 2oo3) (finding the 
Alabama complaint seriously substandard). 
217In Ryan, Chancellor Chandler pressed the point, stating expressly that the Court of 
Chancery "has recognized that the adequacy of the complaint is a more important factor than time of 
filing in a McWane analysis .... " Ryan, 918 A.2d at 349. 
2I8Vice Chancellor Strine explained: 
[T]he Delaware Complaint dealt comprehensively with a series of trades and 
transactions by HealthSouth directors that the plaintiffs allege were consummated 
when the directors knew of the adverse effect the Group Rate Policy would have 
on HealthSouth, but the market did not. As important, the Delaware Complaint 
pled demand excusal with particularity. 
Biondi, 820 A.2d at 1160. 
2191d. at 1162. 
22~ Biondi, Vice Chancellor Strine concluded that even the amended complaint in the 
112 DELAWARE JOURNAL OP CORPORATE LAW [Vol. 34 
Of course, pleadings matter tremendously. The adequacy or inade-
quacy of the complaint in shareholder lawsuits is an increasingly contentious 
matter at both the state and federal level. 221 There is far more attention being 
paid to the adequacy of the pleadings at the motions phase of corporate law 
derivative and class actions.222 In state law derivative suits, complaints must 
contain particularized statements demonstrating demand futility-which is to 
say, in effect, a reason to doubt the board's capacity to objectively consider 
the merits of the lawsuit. 223 And in state law class actions, including 
disputes in M&A transactions, the complaint must present sufficient basis 
for the court to certify the class.224 So the adequacy of pleadings is 
extremely important in both these essential corporate lawsuits. 
However, as the Delaware judges are surely aware, adequacy and 
"quality" are not equivalents. It does not serve Delaware's interest to go 
forward in parallel proceedings (where the earlier-filed complaint is still 
pending) merely because the later-filed complaint before it is "better 
drafted." Doing so risks making the Delaware courts appear, once again, 
self-aggrandizing and, in this circumstance, petty and pedantic. 
3. Less Deference to Plaintiffs' Choices 
in Derivative and Class Actions 
In several of its recent forum rulings in parallel proceedings, the Court 
of Chancery cited the representative nature of the litigation as a rationale for 
keeping forum (notwithstanding that it had the later-filed complaint). It 
extended this rationale of less deference to plaintiffs' forum choices in both 
derivative and class actions.225 
Why would the court afford lesser deference to plaintiffs' forum 
choices in derivative actions? In a derivative action, of course, the company 
is technically the injured party. The shareholders have suffered a loss 
Alabama "Tucker Action" was deficient. Id. at 1153-54. 
22lSee, e.g., Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007) (clarifying 
the heightened pleading standards endorsed in the Private Securities Litigation Refonn Act of 1995). 
222Por discussion of Delaware's jurisprudence on pleading standards in derivative and class 
actions, see Solomon v. Pathe Commc'ns Corp., 672 A.2d 35, 38-39 (Del. 1996). 
223See, e.g., McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808, 816-17 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Aronson v. 
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984» (discussing the pleading requirements for demonstrating demand 
futility). 
224Por a case illustrating Delaware's approach to class certification, see Barbieri v. Swing-N-
Slide Corp., No. 14,239, 1996 WL 255907, at *2-6 (Del. Ch. May 7,1996), reprinted in 21 DEL. I. 
CORP. L. 1073, 1077-83 (1996). 
225ln re The Topps Co. S'holders Litig., 924 A.2d 951,957 (Del. Ch. 2007)(quoting Biondi, 
820 A.2d at 1159) (finding "the application of McWane to class and representative actions ... 
'troublesome,' because 'the potential divergence in the best interests of the plaintiffs' attorneys and 
the plaintiffs they are purporting to represent"'). 
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derivatively through their interest as equity holders. At the level of formal 
law, the plaintiffs operate as "mere surrogates" asserting the corporation's 
claim in a derivative action. It is this formalism of shareholders as "mere 
surrogates," presumably, that is the Court of Chancery's rationale for 
affording their forum choice lesser deference in parallel proceedings. 
This principle of affording lesser deference to plaintiffs' forum choice 
in derivative actions was fIrst enunciated by the Court of Chancery in its 
1998 opinion in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Scandipharm, Inc. 226 More 
recently it was afftrmed in Biondi v. Scrushy, where Vice Chancellor Strine 
opined that the "potential divergence in the best interests of the plaintiffs' 
attorneys and the plaintiffs they are purporting to represent" justifIes less 
deference to plaintiffs' forum choice in derivative actions.227 
In actuality, the formal status of shareholder plaintiffs as "mere 
surrogates" in derivative actions seems like a red herring. More plausibly, it 
reflects the Court of Chancery's open cynicism about plaintiffs-lawyers' 
conduct in representative actions (as described earlier). For example, in 
Topps, Vice Chancellor Strine observed that plaintiffs' lawyers are seeking to 
file outside of Delaware in order to leverage greater uncertainty and earn 
higher fees. In so doing, he opined, they are undermining the best interests of 
Delaware shareholders in general.228 Of course, Vice Chancellor Strine is 
entitled to his opinion about plaintiffs' lawyers. But certainly Delaware 
should not codify suspicions about the possible selfIsh motives of plaintiffs' 
lawyers' into its choice of forum doctrine under the rubric of shareholders 
being "mere surrogates" for the corporation in derivative actions.229 
The unobserved difference in the status of shareholder-plaintiffs in 
derivative actions and class actions is also quite problematic. In Topps, the 
Court of Chancery extended the "lesser deference to plaintiffs' forum choice" 
rationale from derivative actions to class actions (and rejected the motion to 
stay the later-filed class claim before it). In reviewing the motion to stay the 
class action before the court, Vice Chancellor Strine opined that "[i]n the 
representative action context, McWane has far less bite and for good reason. 
226713 A.2d 925, 929 n.l (Del. Ch. 1998). 
227Bionlii, 820 A.2d at 1159. 
228Topps, 924 A.2d at 959 ("Random results may be good for plaintiffs' lawyers who can 
use the uncertainty factor that comes with disparate forums to negotiate settlements of cases that 
might otherwise be dismissed as unmeritorious. But random litigation results are not good for 
investors. "). 
229In Ryan v. Gifford, the Court of Chancery expansively embraced the principle of "lesser 
deference in derivative actions," opining that the McWane presumption of staying later-filed claims 
"presents great difficulty in shareholder derivative actions." Ryan v. Gifford, 918 A.2d 341, 349 
(Del. Ch. 2007). 
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A flrst-flling plaintiff has no legitimacy to 'call forum' for all the other 
stockholders .... ,,230 In Topps, not only did the court fail to account for the 
distinctly different status of shareholder-plaintiffs in derivative and class 
actions, but, troublingly, the court erroneously described them as being 
"logically identical.,,231 In actuality, the "plaintiffs as mere surrogates" ra-
tionale is wholly inapplicable to class actions. In class actions, shareholder-
plaintiffs assert a direct injury they have incurred as a collective body. If the 
"mere surrogate" argument were the true basis for affording lesser deference 
to plaintiffs' forum choice in representative actions, it would certainly not be 
relevant to class actions. 
In actuality, there are reasons to be suspicious of the court's rationale 
of "lesser deference to plaintiffs' forum choice" as applied to both derivative 
and class actions. In derivative actions, the plaintiffs will almost always be 
barred from going forward unless the board itself is incapable of asserting 
the company's interest (i.e., that "demand is excused"). In such an instance, 
the "mere surrogate" rationale for lesser deference to the plaintiffs' forum 
choice is no longer relevant. As for class actions, there is no reason at all to 
afford class plaintiffs' forum choice lesser deference, unless it is because the 
shareholder-plaintiffs are acting collectively. But this would be an odd 
rationale indeed, because in corporate law, collective bodies are the norm. 
Corporations, boards, and shareholders are all collective bodies, and this is 
never treated as a reason to afford their decisions less respect. The rationale 
of giving less respect to plaintiffs' forum choices in representative actions is 
most likely a placeholder, a cipher. Its function is to provide more discretion 
to the Court of Chancery to deny motions to stay in parallel corporate 
proceedings governed by Delaware law. Indeed, once the court has 
volunteered that less deference is owed to plaintiffs' forum choice in both 
derivative and direct actions, it has essentially acknowledged this. 
This is because almost all shareholder actions against public 
companies are brought either as derivative or direct actions.232 Claims of 
breach of loyalty, breach of care, and bad faith are almost always brought as 
derivative suits. Claims challenging M&A transactions are mostly brought 
as class actions. The Court of Chancery's move in the direction of affording 
lesser deference to plaintiffs' choice of forum in representative parallel 
proceedings is therefore deeply problematic. It represents a sweeping 
230Topps, 924 A.2d at 956. 
2311d. at 957. 
2321d. ("The reality is that every merger involving Delaware public companies draws 
shareholder litigation within days of its announcement. An unseemly filing Olympiad typically en-
sues .... "). 
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expansion of judicial discretion and a sweeping diminution in the respect 
afforded plaintiffs' forum choice as a general matter.233 In addition, it 
contradicts the most basic principle in/arum non conveniens jurisprudence, 
including Delaware's own (that is, respect for plaintiffs' choice of forum). 
Moreover, it appears patently hypocritical because Delaware seems perfectly 
happy to respect plaintiffs' forum choice in representative actions where 
Delaware has the fIrst-fIled claim. Once again, the new post-McWane 
framework seems short on principle and long on ambition. 
This approach to comity may be a good short-term strategy for 
keeping Delaware corporate lawsuits, but it risks damaging the intellectual 
coherence and principled integrity upon which Delaware corporate law's 
long-term preeminence rests. 
4. Keeping Cases Presenting Novel Issues 
of Delaware Law 
The fInal criteria the Court of Chancery has invoked as a basis for 
keeping forum in parallel proceedings is whether the case presents a novel 
issue of Delaware law. 234 This rationale has a stronger basis in law than the 
ones scrutinized above. Consistent with the lAD, where a novel issue of 
Delaware corporate law is presented, Delaware has a persuasive claim to 
keep forum and resolve the question.235 
The problem with the novel issue criteria is not theoretical. It is 
practical. While the novel issue test sounds clear in the abstract, in practice 
its application would be almost wholly subjective and arbitrary. If "novel 
legal issue" means a question of fIrst impression, the test would be clear, but 
also mostly irrelevant. Genuine legal questions of fIrst impression are 
extremely rare, perhaps especially in corporate law. The constancy of 
fIduciary principles (the duty of care, loyalty, and good faith) means that 
there are hardly ever any genuine legal issues of fIrst impression. Rather, it 
is the application of these constant fIduciary precepts to changing factual 
scenarios that makes the cases challenging and important. Indeed, the facts 
in corporate law cases are never precisely the same. And if the stakes were 
not high, the parties would have likely settled. 
233See supra Part V.B.3 and accompanying text. 
234See, e.g., In re The Topps Co. S'holders Litig., 924 A.2d 951 (Del. Ch. 2007); Ryan v. 
Gifford, 918 A.2d 341 (Del. Ch. 2(07); Rapoport v. Litig. Trust of MDlP, Inc., No. I035-N,2oo5 
WL 3277911 (Del. Ch. Nov. 23, 2005). 
23sThis rationale is articulated most forcefully in Topps, as described more fully in infra Part 
V.E. 
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Should "unique" transactional facts that require the court to reinterpret 
or expand settled legal principles "count" to keep forum under the "novel 
issue of law" test? If so, then the novel issue standard provides Delaware a 
basis for keeping forum in almost all parallel proceedings. As this short 
review illustrates, the application of the "novel issues of law" test for 
keeping forum is highly indeterminate. Where the Court of Chancery wishes 
to keep the dispute, it should have little difficulty making the case for there 
being a novel issue of law. And the contrary is also true. 
This indeterminacy is reflected most clearly, perhaps, in the Court of 
Chancery's interpretation of the novel issue standard in the Bear Steams 
litigation (where the court granted the requested stay). In that case, the sale 
transaction was protected by lock ups of unprecedented dimension; the bank 
was certainly "in the vicinity" of insolvency; and the stakes could not have 
been higher. Nevertheless, the Court of Chancery concluded that while the 
facts were novel, the case presented no novel issue of Delaware corporate 
law (a conclusion that is difficult to accept at face value).236 The other cases 
where the novel issue of law test has been applied do not inspire greater 
confidence. 
In Topps, the court resolved that, in keeping forum, novel fiduciary 
loyalty issues were presented by the senior executives having obtained the 
right to remain in office after the company's sale to a private equity buyer.237 
In Ryan, the court held that the allegations of stock options backdating 
presented novel fiduciary loyalty issues, and the court resolved to keep 
forum. 238 In Rapoport v. Litigation Trust of MDIP Inc., 239 the court found 
2361n re Bear Stearns Cos. S'holder Litig., No. 3643-VCP, 2008 WL 959992, at *6 (Del. Ch. 
Apr. 9, 2008), reprinted in 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 515, 524 (2008) ("Despite Plaintiffs' protestations to 
the contrary, the claims asserted in the Complaint only require the application of well-settled 
principles of Delaware law to evaluate the deal protections in the merger and the alleged breaches of 
fiduciary duty."). For commentary also concluding that the litigation presented many open and 
substantial issues under Delaware corporate law doctrine, see Kahan & Rock, supra note 4. 
Id. 
237Topps, 924 A.2d at 954. As described in Topps: 
[Tlhe reality is that the Topps Merger is part of a newly emerging wave of going 
private transactions involving private equity buyers who intend to retain current 
management. This wave raises new and subtle issues of director responsibility that 
have only begun to be considered by our state courts. This factor bears importantly 
on the question of where this case should be heard. When new issues arise, the 
state of incorporation has a particularly strong interest in addressing them, and 
providing guidance. 
238Ryan v. Gifford, 918 A.2d 341, 350 (Del. Ch. 2(07) ("The allegations in this case involve 
backdating option grants and whether such practice violates one or more of Delaware's common law 
fiduciary duties. This question is one of great import to the law of corporations. "). 
239No. 1035-N, 2005 WL 3277911, at *2 (Del. Ch. Nov. 23,2(05) ("This action will likely 
raise at least one novel issue of Delaware corporate law: whether directors and officers' duties 
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that a novel issue regarding boards' fiduciary duties was presented on 
account of the company's growing insolvency. 240 In each instance, there are 
reasons to be skeptical of the Court of Chancery's "novel issues of law" 
conclusion. With respect to Topps, Delaware has well-developed case law 
regarding boards' duties in overseeing and/or participating in buyouts. 241 In 
regard to the options backdating alleged in Ryan, Delaware has well-
developed case law addressing boards' duties in overseeing executive 
compensation under the duty of care, disclosure, 242 and good faith. 243 
In sum, the "novel issues" rationale is almost entirely malleable-so 
plastic and indeterminate that it lacks meaning as a legitimate decisional 
criterion. Court of Chancery risks losing legitimacy when it invokes the 
"novel issue of law" test as a rationale to keep forum. 
If Delaware is going to embrace the "novel issues of law" test as a 
rationale for keeping forum in parallel proceedings, this creates a conflict 
vis-a-vis its forum non conveniens jurisprudence. As mentioned previously, 
Delaware has chosen to deny defendants' forum non conveniens motions 
even where keeping the case requires it to resolve novel issues in sister 
states' corporate laws. This was exemplified in Berger v. Intelident 
Solutions, Inc, as discussed earlier.244 The Delaware courts cannot afford to 
change materially in the face of 'deepening insolvency."'). 
240Id. In fact, Delaware has a fairly expansive case law on the changing (or unchanging) 
duties of directors in the face of corporate insolvency. See, e.g., Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ'ns Co., 621 
A.2d 784, 789 (Del. Ch. 1992) ("The existence of the fiduciary duties at the moment of insolvency 
may cause directors to choose a course of action that best serves the entire corporate enterprise rather 
than any single group interested in the corporation at a point in time when the shareholders' wishes 
should not be the directors only concern."); Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe 
Commc'ns Corp., No. 12,150, 1991 WL 277613, at *34 (Del. Ch. Dec. 31, 1991), reprinted in 17 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 1099, 1155 (1992) (discussing "where a corporation is operating in the vicinity of 
insolvency," the directors owe duties not merely to shareholders but to the entire corporate 
enterprise, including the corporation's shareholders). For commentary, see Geoffrey B. Morawetz, 
Under Pressure: Governance of the Financially Distressed Corporation, in CORPORATE 
GoVERNANCE IN GLOBAL CAPITAL MARKETS 275 (Janis Sarra ed., 2(03). 
241Tbe recent private equity deals are an extension of the management buyouts of the 1980s, 
which have been addressed in depth in Delaware's M&A case law. See, e.g., Barkan v. Amsted 
Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279 (Del. 1989); Roberts v. Gen. Instrument Corp., No. 11,639, 1990 WL 
118356 (Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 1990), reprinted in 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1540 (1991); In re RJR 
Nabisco, Inc., S'holders Litig., No. 10,389,1989 WL 7036 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989), reprinted in 14 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 1132 (1989). 
242See, e.g., Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 9-10 (Del. 1998); Jack B. Jacobs, The 
Fiduciary Duty of Disclosure after Dabit, 2 J. Bus. & TEcH. L. 391 (2007); Faith Stevelman Kahn, 
Transparency and Accountability: Rethinking Corporate Fiduciary Law's Relevance to Corporate 
Disclosure, 34 GA. L. REV. 505 (2000). 
243See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369 (Del. 2006). For discussion, see generally Hillary 
A. Sale, Monitoring Caremark's Good Faith, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 719 (2007) (discussing a triad of 
recent fiduciary duty cases, including Stone). 
244906 A.2d 134, 136-38 (Del. 2(06); see also Kolber v. Holyoke Shares, Inc., 213 A.2d 
444 (Del. 1965). In Kolber, the Delaware Supreme Court noted that: 
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be seen as bullying and disingenuous-acting defensively to keep cases that 
present novel issues of Delaware law, while acting aggressively to keep 
cases that present novel issues of other states' corporate laws. The Delaware 
courts cannot retain their preeminence in corporate law in this fashion. They 
would lose respect and damage the stature of Delaware corporate law. 
5. The Indeterminate Effect of Contractual Choice 
of Forum Provisions 
Parties may contract over choice of forum. Indeed they commonly do 
so in merger agreements and other highly negotiated corporate and 
commercial contracts.245 In several of the cases described herein, there were 
transactional documents which included choice of forum provisions.246 
Remarkably, in the Topps and Bear Steams forum disputes, the Court of 
Chancery's forum decisions directly conflicted with the choice of forum 
provisions in the transactional documents. In Topps, there was a merger 
agreement which contained a New York choice of law and choice of forum 
clause.247 Yet the Court of Chancery refused to grant the defendants' 
requested stay in favor of the New York Supreme Court~espite the choice 
of forum clause and despite New York's expressed intention to go 
forward. 248 In Bear Steams, the transactional documents (a merger and 
stock exchange agreement) included a Delaware choice of forum provision. 
But here the Court of Chancery granted the stay in favor of New York. 249 In 
both instances, the Court of Chancery's forum decision was counter to the 
forum choice codified in the parties' contracts. 
How could this happen? One reason may be the legal ambiguity sur-
rounding the scope of such choice of forum provisions. Though the forum 
provisions obviously would apply to claims contesting the terms of the 
[t]his leaves the reason that unsettled New York law governs the case. This 
factor is not sufficient reason, in our opinion, for dismissal under the doctrine of 
forum non conveniens, either alone or in combination with the other factors 
mentioned. It is not unusual, of course, for Delaware courts to deal with open 
questions of the law of sister states or of foreign countries. 
Id. at 446. 
24sFor empirical analysis demonstrating that choice of forum provisions are far less common 
than choice of law provisions in corporate and commercial instruments, and that parties less 
commonly select Delaware forum than Delaware choice of law, see Eisenberg & Miller, The Flight 
to New York, supra note 160. 
246See, e.g., In re Bear Stearns Cos., S'holder Utig., No. 3643-VCP, 2008 WL 959992 (Del. 
Ch. Apr. 9, 2008), reprinted in 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 515 (2008); In re The Topps Co. S'holders 
Litig., 924 A.2d 951 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
247Topps, 924 A.2d at 962. 
248/d. at 964-65. 
249Bear Stearns, 2008 WL 959992, at *7, reprinted in 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. at 526. 
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transactional documents, the forum provisions might not be construed to 
extend to fiduciary breach claims contesting the board's or officers' conduct 
in the transactions. In Topps and Bear Steams, the claims before the Court 
of Chancery focused on fiduciary questions, not contract-based ones. 
Delaware's ability to countermand (or disregard) forum provisions in M&A 
documents depends on the continued preeminence of fiduciary issues in 
these disputes, in comparison to more narrowly contractual claims and 
disputes. Of course, the Delaware courts will continue to highlight the 
pertinent fiduciary issues in transactional cases based on Delaware law. This 
is their core competence and the basis for their prestige. But if transactions 
involving Delaware public companies are litigated out of state, the contract 
law dimensions of these cases may obtain greater salience. This may be part 
of Delaware's calculus in keeping forum in parallel proceedings. 
E. Topps-A Case Study in Keeping Forum 
In 2007, in its Topps decision, the Court of Chancery makes 
something akin to a universal claim of right to keep forum over Delaware 
corporate lawsuits in parallel proceedings. Topps' claims for Delaware forum 
cohere around two principles. The first, based on the lAD, is that Delaware 
incorporation (and thus Delaware choice of law) mandate Delaware forum. 
The second is that keeping Delaware corporate lawsuits in the Delaware 
courts is "efficient," in the sense of wealth maximizing, and thus best for 
investors. These claims are analyzed below. 
1. Internal Affairs Unbound: Our Law, Our Forum 
Building on the bedrock of the lAD, Topps expands the "novel issues" 
rationale to a near universal claim of right on Delaware's part to keep forum 
in Delaware corporate lawsuits.25o This is not the lAD as a choice of law 
regime, of course. Rather, in Topps, the Court of Chancery invokes the 
older, sovereignty-imbued lAD to propose that other courts should defer to 
Delaware in cases governed by Delaware corporate law.251 The basic notion 
is that choice of forum should match choice of law-that the Delaware 
courts have a superior right to hear cases governed by Delaware corporate 
law. Hence, in parallel proceedings involving Delaware corporate law 
claims, Delaware should "win." 
250Topps, 924 A.2d at 958. 
2511d. at 953-54. 
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To support this claim, the court cites two legal precedents: Rogers v. 
Guaranty Trust Co. of New York,252 a five-to-four decision from the United 
States Supreme Court decided in 1933; and Langfelder v. Universal 
Laboratories, Inc.,253 a decision of the New York Court of Appeals from 
1944. The problem is that these citations do not add force to the court's 
forum argument because both cases have been superseded, if not overruled. 
The New York case, Langfelder, held that foreign courts should defer 
to the courts of the incorporating state in corporate law cases.254 It based its 
holding on the lAD-the idea being that foreign states should avoid 
meddling in the internal affairs of corporations incorporated elsewhere.255 
Langfelder's view of comity in corporate law cases was, however, subse-
quently rejected by the New York appellate courts. This is evident from the 
case of Broida v. Bancro/t,256 decided in 1984, for example. (Nor, despite 
the citation in Topps, would New York's precedents have any real, binding 
authority for Delaware in this matter, of course.) 
The U.S. Supreme Court precedent cited in Topps is similarly 
unhelpful to its "superior claim to forum" argument. As it bears on comity 
in corporate law cases, Rogers has also been superseded (if not overruled) by 
the U.S. Supreme Court, as mentioned earlier.257 In Koster v. (American) 
Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. ,258 the Court admonished that Rogers did 
not establish a rule that foreign courts should defer to the courts of the 
incorporating state- rather, only, that it was within their discretion to so 
defer in deciding motions in forum disputes.259 In sum, these precedents do 
not support Topps' claim that foreign courts should defer to Delaware in 
Delaware corporate lawsuits. 
Moving away from precedent, Topps next embraces the older 
sovereignty-based concepts which have attached to the lAD to support the 
argument that Delaware courts have a superior right to resolve Delaware 
252288 U.S. 123 (1933). 
25356 N.E.2d 550 (N.Y. 1944). 
2541d. at 552. 
2551d. 
256478 N.Y.S.2d 333 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (reversing lower courts dismissal of a 
shareholders' derivative action against a foreign corporation); see also Tosi v. Pastene & Co., 308 
N.Y.S.2d 472 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970) (denying amotion to dismiss and allowing aNew York court 
to entertain a proceeding to dissolve a foreign corporation under the common-law standard). 
257 See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text. 
258330 U.S. 518 (1947). 
259In Koster, (the later and, hence, more authoritative case), the Supreme Court held that 
"[t]here is no rule of law ... which requires dismissal of a suitor from the forum on a mere showing 
that the trial wiD involve issues which relate to the internal affairs of a foreign corporation." Id. at 
527. 
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corporate lawsuits. The opinion reiterates the nostrum that corporations are 
"creatures of state law" and affmns the principle that singularity in corporate 
choice of law is of the essence.260 These arguments were front and center in 
the VantagePoint litigation of course, and their shortcomings were discussed 
previously in Part m.261 Invoking the lAD and state sovereignty principles, 
Topps proposes that it is customary or legally "normal" for choice of law to 
be dispositive of choice of forum (or at least that this should be the rule in 
forum disputes in parallel proceedings). But at least since the second half of 
the twentieth century, as described earlier, this has not been the rule. 
Instead, as the result of expansive rules of personal jurisdiction, federal 
diversity and supplemental jurisdiction, and federal removal and transfer 
rules, state corporate law claims are triable and are tried in many different 
state and federal forums.262 
Hence, a rule of judicial deference to the incorporating state's courts 
would be a new rule, or the return to an outmoded, early twentieth-century 
rule. Collapsing choice of forum into choice of law is definitively not the 
current rule or practice. Topps' claim that Delaware corporate lawsuits 
belong in Delaware, consistent with the lAD, simply does not fit the present 
legal reality. 
Returning to precedent, as set forth in the Cryo-Maid factors endorsed 
by the Delaware Supreme Court, choice of law is indeed a factor that may be 
relevant in a forum dispute. For example, whether Delaware law governed 
would be one of several factors that the Delaware courts might properly 
consider, under the Cryo-Maid factors, in entertaining a motion to stay or 
dismiss. But as described in Cryo-Maid, which state's law governs would 
ordinarily have no special weight in the resolution of the forum dispute. It 
might obtain special weight in the court's consideration of whether to stay or 
dismiss, but only if there was something exceptional in the law presented by 
the case-some exceptional legal question "which the courts of ... [the state 
of incorporation] more properly should decide than those of another 
jurisdiction. ,,263 Against the background of the Cryo-Maid factors, and the 
2flJ1n re The Topps Co. S'holders Litig., 924 A.2d 951, 953 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
261See supra Part m.E (discussing ihe VantagePoint litigation). 
262Por discussion, see EDWARD A. PuRCELL, JR., LmGATION AND INEQUAUTY 224-54 
(1992). 
263Berger v. Intelident Solutions, Inc., 906 A.2d 134, 136 (Del. 2006). As stated in Berger's 
enumeration of ihe Cryo.Maid factors, in considering ihe six factors which affect equitable forum 
disputes, ihe Delaware courts should consider: "(4) wheiher ihe controversy is dependent upon ihe 
application of Delaware law which the courts of this State more properly should decide than those 
of another jurisdiction . ... " Id. (emphasis added). If Delaware law was an inherently compelling 
determinant of Delaware control over forum, ihe caveat at ihe end would be redundant. In point of 
fact, in its post-McWane jurisprudence, ihe Court of Chancery has often dropped ihe full text of 
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New York and U.S. Supreme Court precedents cited by the court, Topps' 
arguments based on the lAD, and its efforts to tie choice of forum to choice 
of law fall flat. 
2. Delaware Adjudication and Clarity 
in Delaware Corporate Law 
As expressed in Topps and elsewhere, the Court of Chancery's most 
fervent claim for keeping forum in parallel proceedings is that Delaware 
adjudication will foster optimal clarity and coherence in Delaware corporate 
law. Because Delaware courts will produce the clearest decisions, according 
to the Court of Chancery's recent forum rulings, keeping Delaware corporate 
law in the Delaware courts will benefit investors. As stated in Topps, the 
adjudication of Delaware corporate law by other state or federal courts will, 
to the contrary, increase doctrinal uncertainty and incoherence, and thus 
increase economic inefficiency harmful to investors.264 
This conviction is repeated throughout the Topps opinion. As stated 
therein: "[TJhe chartering state has a powerful interest in ensuring the 
uniform interpretation and enforcement of its corporation law, so as to 
facilitate economic growth and efficiency. ,,265 Elsewhere Topps states that "a 
state has a compelling interest in ensuring the consistent interpretation and 
enforcement of its corporation law. ,,266 And in another section, Topps states 
that "important coherence-generating benefits created by our judiciary's 
handling of corporate disputes are endangered if our state's compelling 
public policy interest in deciding these disputes is not recognized and 
decisions are instead routinely made by a variety of state and federal judges 
who only deal episodically with our law.,,267 Obviously, these are tremen-
dously passionate calls for keeping Delaware corporate lawsuits in the 
Delaware courts. 
In some measure, they are empirical claims---claims about the causal 
relationship between choice of law, choice of forum, doctrinal clarity, and 
economic efficiency. The testing of the empirical dimensions of these claims 
is beyond the bounds of this article. It is noteworthy, however, that as 
empirical claims for keeping Delaware corporate law in Delaware's 
factor four and abbreviated it as being merely "whether Delaware law applies to the action." But in 
so doing the Court of Chancery has altered the Cryo-Maid factors as recognized by the Delaware 
Supreme Court. 
264Topps, 924 A.2d at 953, 958-59. 
265/d. at 953. 
266 /d. at 958. 
267/d. at 959. 
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courtrooms, they are not supported by the Court of Chancery's citation to 
empirical evidence. 
Experience, at least, would seem to contradict the above assertion that 
efficiency losses and doctrinal chaos will result from the emigration of 
Delaware corporate law claims. This is because we already live in a system 
where litigants have, and have had for decades, substantial choices among 
other state and federal forums in adjudicating Delaware corporate law cases. 
There are no signs that this freedom of choice has had dire effects on 
Delaware's doctrine, the broader legal system, or the economy. Indeed, the 
Court of Chancery's opinions have effectively conceded as much because 
their starting point is that Delaware corporate law doctrine is presently clear 
and coherent. 
What has most likely changed is not the potential for investors to be 
harmed by Delaware corporate lawsuits being adjudicated elsewhere. Nor is 
Delaware's fiduciary doctrine likely to be rendered incoherent by other state 
or federal courts' interpretations. What has most likely changed is 
Delaware's perception of the likelihood of it sustaining its successful 
chartering business and its preeminence in nationally significant corporate 
law. Apparently the Court of Chancery believes that it can bolster 
Delaware's future preeminence in corporate law by keeping more Delaware 
corporate lawsuits in Delaware courts. But the particular arguments that the 
Court of Chancery is making and the rationales and principles it is invoking 
for keeping forum in parallel proceedings are not particularly coherent or 
persuasive. They are more likely to undermine the quality and integrity of 
Delaware corporate law than promote it. 
3. Reconsidering Clarity and Efficiency 
in Delaware Corporate Law 
In considering the Court of Chancery's claims about out-of-state 
adjudication and its potential to render Delaware corporate law less clear and 
coherent, it is essential to recall that decisions from other jurisdictions are 
nonbinding on Delaware or other courts' interpretations of Delaware law. As 
a matter of formal law , only the Delaware courts (and legislature) can defme 
Delaware corporate law. Other states cannot truly damage Delaware corpo-
rate law, at least not directly. 
So, again, in what sense could the adjudication of Delaware corporate 
law by other state or federal judges impair that law or Delaware's interests? 
"Bad" decisions from other states could potentially damage the popular 
perception of the quality of Delaware law. This could hurt Delaware's 
chartering business. "Bad" decisions from other courts could reduce 
chartering firms' confidence that they will get what they think they are 
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paying for; this could reduce finns' incentives for chartering in Delaware. 
Widespread variation in other tribunals' adjudication of Delaware corporate 
law could reduce the indentifiability of Delaware's brand of corporate law, 
which also might reduce an out-of-state firm's incentive to charter in 
Delaware. Truly radical "claims flight" could eventually diminish Dela-
ware's corporate case load so that its body of corporate law precedents would 
be less rich, and its judges less practiced. Claims emigration at this level, 
however, is highly unlikely. And, finally, there is the feedback effect 
described earlier. If plaintiffs or defendants commonly anticipate that they 
will achieve more favorable results by litigating out of state, then Delaware 
judges may have to adjust their own decision making in order to diminish the 
incentive for such claims emigration. This article proposes that the system's 
porousness is ultimately good for Delaware corporate law. But the loss of 
control would not feel good to Delaware's judges. 
At this juncture the loss of clarity issue deserves some further 
consideration on the merits. The law and economics school of thought has 
conflated clear corporate law with good, wealth maximizing corporate law. 
But the connection has been pressed too far. Law can be clear and yet 
inefficient in its result. The operative notion has been that so long as private 
laws are clear and relatively stable, and choice among different systems of 
law is possible, then private parties will select the best, most wealth-
maximizing laws. The narrative is quite compelling at this theoretical level. 
In practice, however, there are limits and impediments that disrupt the tight 
circuit between clear law and wealth maximization. For example, investing 
is not a la carte: you cannot separately assemble a company you like, in an 
industry you like, with the managers you trust, and the corporate laws you 
prefer, or ideally would prefer. The choices are not infinite, and they are 
bundled. And information is incomplete. And rationality is bounded-and 
that only begins the discussion of the behavioral limits affecting investors' 
pursuit of profit and law's role in promoting it. This means that claims for 
the connection between clear law and wealth maximization are easily 
exaggerated. There are intrinsic "glitches" in the clarity/efficiency circuit. 
Stripping away this supra-layer of theory, just how clear and coherent 
is Delaware's fiduciary doctrine anyway? In actuality, certain well respected 
scholars have argued that Delaware's success in corporate law is attributable 
in large measure to its law's Gnostic qualities. That for the most part, 
Delaware's fiduciary doctrine is comprised of normatively saturated, 
ethical/transactional "sermons" served up with a large dose of caution 
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regarding the imposition of harsh, concrete sanctions.268 (The doctrinal 
phenomenon has sometimes been described in terms of "acoustic separa-
tion. ") In this vein, Delaware's corporate fiduciary law exists (meta-
phorically speaking) as jurisprudential flashes of divine lightning whose 
primary function is to warn of dire consequences for misconduct without 
starting too many fires. This accepted, characteristic of Delaware's fiduciary 
doctrine does not fit neatly into the model of clear law yields the most 
wealth. 
Even at a simpler, even narrower doctrinal level, there is less clarity in 
Delaware's fiduciary case law than one might anticipate. Professors Kahan 
and Rock have described the present fluidity, if not genuine opacity, in 
several of Delaware's signature fiduciary doctrines relating to boards' duties 
in M&A transactions. They have analyzed these several doctrines as they 
relate to the shareholder claims filed against the sale of Bear Stearns to J.P. 
Morgan.269 Kahan and Rock's writing has accurately captured the multi-
plicity of the relevant fiduciary standards, and the many questions that the 
case law does not clearly resolve, as applied to this recent important 
transaction?70 
There is another reason to doubt Delaware's absolute commitment to 
clarity in corporate law standards. If clarity was the single goal of Dela-
ware's corporate jurisprudence then, presumably, the Court of Chancery 
would stick more closely to the Delaware Supreme Court's pronouncements. 
Instead, the Court of Chancery not uncommonly departs from the letter of 
the law as enunciated by the Delaware Supreme Court. For example, this is 
evident in the forum rulings in parallel proceedings under discussion. The 
Court of Chancery is neither applying the Delaware Supreme Court's forum 
non conveniens jurisprudence (which applies to first-filed claims), nor the 
McWane presumption (favoring the grant of a stay in later-filed claims). 
The Court of Chancery may be entirely justified and wise in charting a 
new course, but in so doing it is not promoting clear corporate law. The 
268See Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory o/Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 
98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1919 (1998). See also Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does 
Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLAL. REV. 1009, 1015-17 (1997) (arguing that DeIaware 
corporate law's vitality lies precisely in its nonnatively laden, open-ended narratives). 
269Kahan & Rock, supra note 4 (discussing the broad range of fiduciary standards relevant 
to the sale of Bear Stearns to J.P. Morgan and their indeterminate application). 
270/d. The Delaware judges have themselves complained about the multiplication of stan-
dards of review in corporate law. This complaint is addressed to the freezeout doctrine by Vice 
Chancellor Strine in Cox. In re Cox Commc'ns, Inc. S'holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 642-47 (Del. 
Ch. 2005). The same complaint was aired at length by members of the Delaware bench. See 
William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Function Over Form: A Reassessment 0/ 
Standards 0/ Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 BUs. LAW. 1287 (2001). 
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same bold" creative destruction" is evident in the Court of Chancery's rulings 
on freezeout transactions. The Court of Chancery has expressed its views on 
the inadequacy of the supreme court's doctrine both for tender offer-based 
freezeouts and single step cash out merger freezeouts, and is seeking to apply 
new standards to both contexts.271 Once again, this may be wise and the 
right thing to do for investors, but there is no question that it makes it more 
difficult to know what Delaware corporate law "is" in these transactions. 
This is quite a dramatic form of "lack of clarity." 
Reading Topps carefully, it is not even clear that the Court of 
Chancery is persuaded that Delaware's fiduciary jurisprudence is so very 
clear and coherent. In Topps, the court argues that really only the five 
chancellors on the Court of Chancery and the five justices on the Delaware 
Supreme Court can dependably apply it accurately and consistently.272 
Topps expressly proposes that the continued coherence of Delaware 
corporate law rests in the hands of the small cadre of judges on the Court of 
Chancery and the Delaware Supreme Court.273 Institutionally speaking, this 
is a very risky argument for Delaware to make in defense of its corporate 
law. In a nation "of laws, not men," the most preeminent brand of U.S. 
corporate law should not be so complex or opaque or vague that it can only 
reliably be interpreted by ten jurists. If Delaware is to keep preeminence as 
the purveyor of national corporate law, it should not be because Delaware 
judges are, like Gnostic priests, uniquely able to interpret it. 
F. More on Motives to Refuse to Stay 
The discussion immediately below focuses on certain incentives which 
are shaping the Court of Chancery's "post-McWane" forum decisions. 
Several of them have been touched on earlier. 
21lFor discussion of the Court of Chancery's, and in particular Vice Chancellor Strine's, 
willingness to take license in reinventing Delaware corporate fiduciary doctrine in regard to 
controllers' going-private transactions, see Stevelman, supra note 43. This is not to say that the vice 
chancellor's interpretations are "incorrect." Rather, the point is that he has been unhesitating in 
altering the fabric of Delaware corporate law as he sees necessary. This may produce better 
fiduciary doctrine, but it does not produce more unifonn or clearer standards-in light of the gaps 
which will arise between the Delaware Supreme Court's pronouncements and the more daring 
members of the Court of Chancery. 
272"[l]t is natural to expect that we have some advantage in our own domain." Topps, 924 
A.2d at 964 n.43. 
273ld. at 958-59 (explaining the benefits derived from having ten judges decide important 
corporate law issues, as opposed to the much larger federal judiciary). 
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1. Publicity, Prestige, and Fees: Delaware's Incentive to 
Keep High-Profile M&A and Self-Dealing Cases 
127 
It is plain that the Court of Chancery is going out of its way to keep 
forum in high-profile M&A cases and fiduciary loyalty and good faith claims 
against Delaware incorporated public companies. These cases are the crown 
jewels, the most value-producing "brands" in Delaware corporate law. 
Delaware needs the fees generated from keeping large, famous public 
companies incorporated in Delaware, and the media attention their 
transactions (and attendant litigation) generate. 
In the category of recent forum disputes in public company M&A 
deals, there is Merrill Lynch,274 Topps,275 and Tyson. 276 In the category of 
alleged fiduciary loyalty and good faith breaches, there is Ryan v. Gifford (a 
stock options backdating case),277 Rapoport v. Litigation Trust of MDIP Inc. 
(alleging loyalty and good faith breaches against corporate directors and 
officers),278 and Biondi v. Scrushy (alleging misrepresentation and insider 
trading claims against directors).279 In each instance, there were substan-
tially equivalent claims proceeding elsewhere, and the Court of Chancery 
had the later-filed complaint before it. If the court had adhered to Mc Wane, 
it would have had to grant the requested stays. Instead, in each of these 
cases, the court rejected the motion to stay~espite parallel litigation having 
been commenced elsewhere. In this respect, the decisions reflect Delaware's 
tenacity in keeping forum and the Court of Chancery's daring inventiveness 
in reaching this result. 
The great exception to this pattern is the Court of Chancery's grant of 
the requested stay in the Bear Stearns case, as mentioned earlier.280 
Watching the company's liquidity evaporate with breathtaking rapidity, Bear 
Stearns's board had agreed to an impromptu, "rescue" sale to J.P. Morgan. 
The transaction was backed by the Federal Reserve and the Treasury-their 
274County of York Employees Ret. Plan v. Merrill Lynch & Co., No. 4066-YCN, 2008 WL 
4824053 (Del. Ch. Oct. 28, 2(08). 
27SIn re The Topps Co. S'holders Litig., 924 A.2d 951 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
276In re mp, Inc. S'holders Litig. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 18,373,2001 WL406292 (Del. 
Ch, Apr. 18,2001). 
277918 A.2d 341, 361 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
278No. 1035-N, 2005 WL 5755438, at *5 (Del. Ch. Nov. 23, 2005) (requiring the court to 
analyze whether directors' or officers' fiduciary loyalty and good faith duties are altered in the face of 
deepening insolvency). 
279820 A.2d 1148, 1166-67 (Del. Ch, 2(03). 
280In re Bear Stearns Cos., S'holder Litig., No. 3643-YCP, 2008 WL 959992, at *8 (Del. 
Ch. Apr. 9, 2008), reprinted in 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 515, 527-28 (2008). 
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support validated the transaction's widely perceived importance to the 
markets. 
Nevertheless, Bear Stearns's shareholders protested that the price was 
too low and that the deal had been forced upon them in light of the lock ups 
granted to J.P. Morgan. Motions for a preliminary injunction to block the 
sale were commenced in the New York Supreme Court, and then in the 
Court of Chancery as well. Upon the defendants' motion, and in the face of 
New York's determination to proceed, Vice Chancellor Parsons granted the 
requested stay.28t 
Why in Bear Steams did the Court of Chancery agree to stay its 
jurisdiction, when it had declined to do so in the other notable cases referred 
to above? In actuality, the move was a deft one on the part of the Court of 
Chancery. Arguably it avoided a classic "lose-lose" situation. 
Granting an injunction against Bear Stearns's sale would have posed 
real dangers for Delaware. On the merits, however, a strong case could be 
made that this was exactly what the court would have to do. The price 
agreed to was quite low; the deal was rushed; and the lock ups were of a 
genuinely unprecedented scale. Though they had been approved by the 
board (evidently in good faith), the lock ups had not been approved by the 
shareholders of course.282 The value conferred on J.P. Morgan in the 
transaction raised genuine doubts about whether Bear Stearns's board had 
fulfilled its fiduciary duties to the company's shareholders in so rapidly 
agreeing to the sale. In light of Delaware's fiduciary precedents, these 
factors suggested that the court might have to grant the preliminary 
injunction. This prospect would have been deeply unnerving for the Court 
of Chancery-{)n account of Bear Stearns's dire financial situation, the 
involvement of the Federal Reserve and the Treasury Department, and the 
possible negative macroeconomic consequences for the financial system if 
Bear Stearns were to fail. Tremendously negative publicity, in the worst 
case, would have been directed against the Delaware court. 
Hence, in Bear Steams, the court faced the prospect of either applying 
the relevant precedents according to their terms, and unsettling a much 
favored transaction, and perhaps the financial system, or departing from its 
established doctrinal framework to facilitate the transaction, thereby 
establishing precedent arguably adverse to Delaware corporate shareholders' 
best interests. Both possibilities would have been unattractive to the court, as 
professors Kahan and Rock have also observed.283 Under these 
28 lid. , reprinted in 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. at 527. 
2821d. 
283For discussion of the court's alternatives, and also the substance of the background 
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circumstances, granting the stay and ceding the "hot seat" to the New York 
Supreme Court seemed to be the most attractive option. 
But granting the stay was not costless for Delaware. Delaware cannot 
maintain its preeminence in corporate law by ducking the issues and hiding 
in the media's shadows. For this reason, seven months later when faced with 
a complaint against the proposed sale of Merrill Lynch to Bank of America, 
the balance of the equities for Delaware tipped in the direction of going 
forward and refusing the requested stay (Le., the opposite conclusion from 
Bear Steams).284 
Importantly, the facts bearing on the motion to stay in the Merrill 
Lynch proceedings would not have augured a different result from Bear 
Steams. Delaware, once again, did not have the ftrst-filed claim. There were 
much earlier-filed derivative claims against Merrill Lynch pending in a New 
York federal court, and claims against the merger were added to the New 
York action three days before the complaint was filed in the Court of 
Chancery. Here, unsettling the transaction by granting an injunction would 
be risky, controversial, and potentially costly for Delaware's reputation. 
Merrill Lynch's ftnancial situation may not have appeared quite as dire as 
Bear Stearns's had been, but the Court of Chancery itself observed (in its 
decision refusing the stay) that the price of Merrill's stock had fallen by 
thirty-six percent in the week before the merger was announced?85 There 
were claims of disclosure deftciencies, unfair price, and even self dealing on 
the part of the board.286 It was not at all obvious, therefore, that the Court of 
Chancery would be able to deny a requested injunction, consistent with its 
ftduciary precedents, especially given the haste in which the deal had been 
agreed to and the absence of a market check.287 
As had been true in Bear Steams, granting the injunction and 
unsettling the transaction would pose peril for investors, the market, and the 
"business friendly" reputation of the court. Yet approving the transaction 
based on its terms would arguably have created bad precedent. Surely the 
court considered the move it had made in Bear Steams: granting the 
requested stay and leaving the quandary to be resolved by the New York 
court. But having ceded the limelight to New York in the Bear Steams 
proceedings, it may just have seemed too costly to the Court of Chancery to 
do so again, so soon, in such a notable transaction. 
fiduciary doctrines relevant to the claims against the sale, see Kahan & Rock, supra note 4. 
284See County of York Employees Ret. Plan v. Merrill Lynch & Co., No. 4066-YCN, 2008 
WL 4824053 (Del. Ch. Oct. 28, 2008). 
2851d• at * 1. 
2861d. 
2871d. 
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In fact, the contrast between the outcomes in the Bear Steams and 
Merrill Lynch forum disputes dramatically illustrates the plasticity of the 
Court of Chancery's new forum jurisprudence for parallel proceedings. 
Plasticity can be good for a court; it allows it to reach decisions which will 
be well received. But this same plasticity may seem like a lack of principled 
coherence, which can damage a court's reputation. 
2. Keeping Control Over the Brand 
in Order to Promote Chartering 
As stated earlier, if claims emigration reached a critical mass, this 
could undermine Delaware's control over its corporate jurisprudence. 
Fending off such a profound loss of control is clearly essential to the state's 
prospects in corporate law. As scholars have noted, Delaware's preeminence 
in corporate law depends on maintaining the expertise of its judiciary, the 
depth of its corporate case law, and the national media attention and prestige 
these produce. Massive claims emigration could certainly erode Delaware's 
success in these respects. If Delaware cannot guarantee particular results in 
the adjudication of cases governed by Delaware corporate law (consistent 
with its precedents)-results that are generally favorable to the corporate 
actors who make the chartering decisions-then those actors will have less 
incentive to charter in Delaware. It is not clear whether Topps is correct that 
promoting jurisdiction over Delaware corporate law cases will promote 
overall economic efficiency, but it is clear that Delaware must lead the 
way-must stay at the forefront of adjudicating novel issues in high-profile, 
high-stakes Delaware corporate law cases-if Delaware is to maintain 
control over its brand and ensure the flourishing of its chartering business. 
That said, this article argues for circumspection in Delaware's exercise 
of discretionary jurisdiction in later-filed parallel proceedings, and 
forbearance vis-a-vis other mechanisms for enforcing forum in Delaware. 
Delaware could lose its preeminence in corporate law by eroding its 
perceived legitimacy-this could happen if it seemed excessively partisan to 
managers'interests. It could also happen if its courts were perceived to base 
decisions in forum disputes on Delaware's best interests, rather than those of 
the litigants. 
3. The Delaware Courts' Incentive 
to Support the Delaware Bar 
There is another incentive that may motivate the Court of Chancery to 
refuse motions to stay in parallel proceedings. This is the mutually 
beneficial professional relationship between the state, its judiciary, and its 
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corporate bar-with respect to both defense and plaintiffs counsel. 
Delaware litigators benefit from forum decisions which concentrate 
Delaware corporate litigation in the Delaware courts. Most of these lawyers 
are "repeat players" before the Court of Chancery-so that a cooperative 
affinity would naturally develop among them. By exercising their authority 
to keep forum in Delaware, Delaware's judges can encourage the state's 
litigators to make valuable investments of intellectual capital in the asset that 
is Delaware corporate law. In promoting this investment by Delaware's 
corporate litigators, Delaware's judges are also fostering the state's leading 
reputation in corporate law, promoting the perpetuation of their own 
expertise, and safeguarding the financial returns which flow to Delaware 
from its chartering business. 
Again, this affirmative, symbiotic professional relationship between 
Delaware's judges and the state's litigators applies even in respect to 
Delaware corporate plaintiffs' lawyers. Especially because the Delaware 
courts are sensitive to federal pressure to "rein in" shareholder litigation, they 
have an interest in supporting the plaintiffs' lawyers and law firms whom 
they respect and have some indirect influence over. In ruling to go forward 
even with later-filed claims in parallel proceedings, the Court of Chancery 
can foster the career of the plaintiffs' firms whom they trust. This is a further 
incentive for Delaware to keep forum in parallel proceedings. 
VI. MECHANISMS FOR KEEPING CASES IN DELAWARE 
AND THEIR RISKS 
Delaware's corporate bar is obviously aware of the damage that could 
result from massive claims emigration. Along with the legislature, these 
lawyers will undoubtedly consider the legal and intra-corporate mechanisms 
which could be used to ensure that corporate lawsuits governed by Delaware 
corporate law remain in Delaware. What measures are available to achieve 
this result, and what are their comparative advantages? 
A. Federal Jurisdiction-A Prologue 
A word about federal jurisdiction is in order. Most importantly, any 
measures to limit shareholder-plaintiffs' otherwise legitimate access to the 
federal courts would almost certainly prove unconstitutional. 
This has profound implications for Delaware corporate law cases. In 
effect, it means that Delaware cannot succeed in corralling Delaware 
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corporate lawsuits into its equity courts. If access to the federal courts 
cannot be waived, then because federal jurisdiction is so commonly 
available,288 the system of litigating Delaware corporate lawsuits will remain 
inherently porous. Indeed, consistent with notions of federalism, it would 
seem intentionally to have been made so, consistent with the interests of 
justice. For example, access to the federal courts based on diversity 
jurisdiction was intended to counteract a perceived bias on the part of the 
state courts against out of state defendants.289 In just this fashion, access to 
forums beyond Delaware's equity courts, as this article contends, exerts a 
salutary, countervailing force against corporate managers' preferences in 
Delaware corporate law. In addition, the fact that the federal courts have not 
"ruined" Delaware corporate law in decades of adjudicating Delaware 
corporate law cases, undermines many of the Court of Chancery's recent 
arguments for the necessity of it keeping forum in parallel proceedings. 
B. Bylaw Provisions 
In theory, shareholders of Delaware corporations could enact bylaw 
provisions restricting their ability to file corporate lawsuits outside of Dela-
ware. That is, they could restrict Delaware corporate lawsuits to the Court of 
Chancery (or the Delaware Superior Court, as applicable) and federal courts 
in Delaware. 
As a general matter, there is no doubt that shareholders have the 
power to enact bylaw amendments. Under section 109 of the DGCL, bylaw 
amendments can be effectuated by a vote of holders of a majority of a 
company's shares.290 Bylaw amendments can also be effectuated by a vote of 
the board, if the board has been granted such authority in the company's 
charter, which is often the case.291 
Relative to the other alternatives discussed below, shareholder-enacted 
bylaws restricting forum choice are the .least troubling. At least a 
superficially plausible argument can be made that they are "consensual," as 
consent is defined in corporate law (i.e., where a vote of the majority of 
shares is binding on the rest). But the argument based on consent is surely 
less than compelling. Unanimous shareholder consent is impossible to 
288Congress has recently altered the standards for defendants to remove cases to the federal 
courts based on diversity. See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Class Action Fairness Act in Perspec-
tive: The Old and the New in Federal Jurisdictional Reform, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 1823, 1856 
(2008). 
289ld. at 1833-34 & n.39. 
2~EL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (2001). 
291ld. 
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obtain. Hence, some shareholders will inevitably challenge the forum 
restrictions in litigation outside of Delaware, arguing that their right to 
litigate in the forum of their choosing has unlawfully been abridged. It is 
entirely plausible that courts beyond Delaware would be sympathetic to such 
complaints about the inequitable nature of bylaw forum restrictions. 
Certainly they have no stake in shoring up Delaware's control over these 
claims. 
An argument that bylaw forum restrictions are unconstitutional, or at 
least inequitable, would be strengthened by the fact that shareholders have so 
few rights under the scheme of corporate law. Their right to pursue effective 
enforcement of the fiduciary duties owed to them, as defined by corporate 
law, is a fundamental one. Courts would reasonably be reluctant to allow 
one group of shareholders to impinge on another group's right to vindicate 
these fiduciary obligations in the forum of their choosing. 
The dubiousness of consent would be infinitely compounded if the 
company had a controlling shareholder-Le., if the controller"s shares had 
counted towards the forum restriction's adoption. The conflict of interest 
would be alleviated if there had been "majority of the minority" consent. 
But as mentioned earlier, Delaware has not been entirely convinced about 
the legitimacy of such a curing vote where controller self dealing is 
present. 292 
The same problems would attach, in stronger form, if the forum 
restricting bylaw had been adopted by the board, without shareholder 
consent. 
C. Charter Provisions 
Under the DGCL, charter amendments require approval of the board 
and a majority of the shares.293 Hence, if a majority of the board and a 
majority of the outstanding shares of a corporation voted in favor, a forum 
restricting charter provision would be lawful under the DGCL. There is at 
least one example of such a charter provision in a Delaware public 
company-that is, NetSuite, InC.294 
292For discussion of the limits placed on controllers' self-dealing transactions and the limited 
effect Delaware has given to approvals which would otherwise cleanse a self dealing taint, see supra 
note 46 and accompanying text. 
293DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242 (2001). 
2~etSuite, Inc. first sold stock to the public in late 2007. See NETSUITE INC., AMENDED 
AND REsTATED CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION art. VI, § 8, available at www.netsuite.coml 
portallpdf/ns-a-and-r-certifIcate-of-incorporation.pdf. 
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Charter provisions are usually more publicly accessible than are bylaw 
provisions. As such they present a somewhat stronger basis for defendants 
to claim that shareholders "accepted the risk" of being restricted to the 
Delaware courts when they purchased their shares. Not all legal rights, 
however, are waivable, and such nonwaivability would probably be given 
more weight where the vindication of fiduciary duties is at stake. 
Forum restricting charter (or bylaw) provisions would certainly inspire 
litigation. Some number of vocal shareholders would foreseeably argue that 
their purported consent to the charter provision was invalid. Companies that 
proposed a charter forum selection provision without ascertaining whether 
they could count on the support of proxy advisory consultants like 
RiskMetrics would be taking a substantial risk of bad publicity.295 And, 
once proxy advisory services become involved, the issue could take on 
salience far in excess of what Delaware lawmakers would have wanted. 
Furthermore, claims that such forum restrictions contributed to clarity 
and efficiency would be undermined by the litigation that the provisions 
would inspire. Even where they passed muster in a shareholder vote, the 
provisions would be tested by plaintiffs in litigation beyond Delaware. One 
state's conclusion about the enforceability of the charter forum restriction 
would not be binding on another. And minor variations in their language 
would provoke further litigation, and further inconsistent rulings. It is 
foreseeable that there would be a profusion of claims against the forum 
restrictions in as many as fifty states. Delaware shareholder-plaintiffs 
preferring to litigate beyond Delaware would simply proceed to do so--
leaving it to the defendants to attempt to enforce the charter or bylaw forum 
restriction in Delaware's favor. Nor is there any reason to presume that other 
state or federal courts would look favorably on the forum restrictions and 
seek to uphold Delaware's jurisdiction. 
Challenges to the enforceability of the charter forum selection clauses 
would add a new, supra-layer of motions practice to the already extensive 
motions practice of modern corporate litigation. For all these reasons, 
charter forum selection provisions, even where they received sufficient 
approval to be lawful, would not promote legal certainty, the efficient 
resolution of disputes, or the maximization of shareholder wealth. (The 
same applies for bylaw provisions restricting forum to Delaware.) Negative 
corporate publicity arising from litigation over the enforceability of forum 
29SFor discussion of the agency problems relating to proxy advisory services, see Belinfanti, 
supra note 156; Daines et aI., supra note 156. 
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restricting charter and bylaw provisions would be costly, distracting, and 
would almost certainly offset any anticipated efficiency gains. 
D. Legislation Restricting Forum Choice 
Delaware legislation that merely "enabled" corporations to adopt 
forum selection clauses would be effectively meaningless. The effect of such 
legislation would depend on whether individual Delaware corporations 
enacted charter or bylaw forum selection provisions, how the individual 
provisions were drafted, and the reception they received in non-Delaware 
courts in cases where they were tested, as discussed above. 
In the alternative, a mandatory Delaware forum restriction enacted 
into the DGCL would pose several salient problems. Once again, there 
would inevitably be shareholder challenges to the law's enforceability. The 
challenges would be based on, inter alia, due process and equitable 
principles. Such a heavy handed approach would certainly call attention to 
itself because the DGCL has so few mandatory terms. A forum restricting 
statute in the DGCL would seem especially out of place because Delaware 
corporate law prides itself on promoting shareholder choice. And when the 
constitutional due process questions are put to the federal courts, other issues 
relevant to Delaware corporate law would likely come to the fore (like the 
constitutional underpinnings of the lAD). It is not obvious that Delaware 
would welcome the result. In sum, Delaware is likely to lose more than it 
would gain from forcing the forum issue through legislation. 
E. Judicial Doctrine (Case Law) 
To reiterate, under its existing, authoritative forum non conveniens 
jurisprudence, Delaware almost universally keeps cases ftrst ftled in its 
courtS.296 No further action by the Delaware courts is required to secure this 
legal practice, or shore up Delaware's discretion to keep ftrst-ftled cases. 
The achilles heel for Delaware jurisdiction is later-ftled claims in 
parallel proceedings. Until the Delaware Supreme Court rules otherwise, the 
Court of Chancery can continue to exert its authority expansively to keep 
forum over these cases. In addition, it is possible for the Court of Chancery 
to issue an injunction against litigation proceeding elsewhere. For example, 
in the Rapoport case, mentioned above, the directors sought but were denied 
296See supra Part V.C.I (discussing Delaware's forum non conveniens jurisprudence). 
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an injunction to arrest parallel proceedings in Ohio.297 The denial of the 
injunction was a wise exercise of comity on Delaware's part. 
At present, in its post-McWane jurisprudence, the Court of Chancery 
is navigating the doctrinal gap between the established forum non 
conveniens jurisprudence and McWane's presumption in favor of a stay. 
Neither expressly addresses forum disputes in parallel proceedings. Hence, 
the Court of Chancery has room to maneuver. But departing from strict 
filing chronology is dicey, and the standards currently being deployed to 
justify this departure are enormously plastic and susceptible to result-
oriented application. Hence, their optics is bad. As the court invokes these 
new, highly subjective standards, it risks making Delaware look grasping 
and insecure with respect to its corporate law-self-aggrandizing, possibly, 
to the disadvantage of the litigants themselves. 
In Topps, the Court of Chancery came close to making a universal 
claim of right for Delaware courts to keep forum where there are parallel 
proceedings in multiple forums governed by Delaware corporate law. But its 
claims based on the lAD, clarity, and efficiency in Delaware corporate law 
are unpersuasive, as illuminated above. 
A ruling from the Delaware Supreme Court would go far to promote 
clarity and coherence in Delaware's treatment of forum disputes in parallel 
proceedings. Adhering to strict filing chronology to resolve these forum 
disputes is one option. Refusing to defer to an earlier-filed complaint that 
the court resolves is legally deficient and would be dismissed also makes 
sense. If interpreted narrowly and conservatively, the presence of a novel 
issue of Delaware corporate law should also tilt the balance of the equities in 
Delaware's favor-though this is a favor that Delaware should be prepared to 
return. 
297Rapoport v. Litig. Trust of MDIP Inc .• No. 1035-N. 2005 WL 3277911. at *8 (Del. Ch. 
Nov. 23. 2005) (refusing to grant requested injunction against proceedings elsewhere). The Court of 
Chancery. however. noted: 
It is well-settled that this Court "is empowered to enjoin a party to an action from 
removing the subject of the controversy to a foreign jurisdiction by filing a later 
action or proceeding in a foreign forum." It is equally well-settled. however. that 
the exercise of such authority "is discretionary in nature and should be exercised 
cautiously." A sense of comity owed to the courts of other states drives this 
caution. 
[d. (quoting Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp .• No. 9281. 1988 WL 34526. at *3 (Del. 
Ch. Apr. 7. 1988); I DONALD J. WOLfE. JR. & MICHAEL A. PiTIENGER. CORPORATE AND 
COMMERCIAL PRACTICE IN THE DELAWARE COURT OF CHANCERY § 5-3 (2005». 
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VIT. CONCLUSION: 
HARDBALL TACTICS FOR KEEPING FORUM 
WOULD BE BAD FOR DELAWARE 
137 
This article began by elucidating the monetary and nonmonetary 
stakes various Delaware actors have in the continued preeminence of the 
state's corporate law. This law generates substantial tax revenues for 
Delaware, fees for its corporate bar, and prestige for the judges deciding 
corporate cases. For these reasons, Delaware's citizens, legislature, corporate 
litigators, and judges have a powerful interest in fostering Delaware 
corporate law's national preeminence. In many respects these high-powered 
stakes will have positive effects. They keep the legislature focused on 
updating the DGCL and the Delaware judges keenly focused on the quality 
and swiftness of their corporate legal decisions. Reflecting their exceptional 
professional commitment, these chancellors and justices frequently speak 
and publish as part of academic and professional conferences, and in so 
doing have promoted the quality and the legitimacy of Delaware's corporate 
law.298 
Yet there is also danger for Delaware in "selling" its corporate law. 
As posited in the race for the bottom literature, because managers rather than 
shareholders select the state of incorporation, there is a danger that 
Delaware's corporate laws will insufficiently attend to agency costs-that is, 
pander to managers' self-interest and under protect shareholders' best 
interests. The ability of the capital markets to discern this bias and limit it is 
uncertain. Admittedly, there is some threat to Delaware's continued 
preeminence from the growth of federal corporate law standards, which 
might eclipse or marginalize Delaware's corporate law. And if there were 
radical claims flight out of Delaware's courts, this too could upset the status 
quo-to Delaware corporate law's detriment. 
But the greatest threat to Delaware corporate law's preeminence would 
be for its lawmakers to overreact and attempt to gain complete control over 
the adjudication of Delaware corporate law cases. Hubris is dangerous. 
Disregarding principles of comity is dangerous. For Delaware to attempt to 
wall off an open-ended system of litigation-the porousness of which helps 
to balance the interests of shareholders and managers-would be dangerous, 
indeed foolhardy. 
298 See Hamermesh, supra note 21, at 1788-92 app. A (outlining a series of appearances and 
public remarks made by members of the Delaware judiciary at public forums on corporate law); 
Kahan & Rock, supra note 42, at 1603 n.117 (providing a detailed list of corporate law-related 
publications by recent members of the Delaware judiciary). 

